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                                                                 Abstract 
 
 
Patterns of economic inequality across three Chinese regions-- the West, the Inland, and 
the Coastal area-- changed twice from 1949 to 2005. During the period 1949 to 1979 
regional inequality decreased, and after 1979 inequality increased.  
        Previous studies, including economic models, cultural studies, and international 
relations theory, cannot fully explain changes in Chinese regional inequality after 1949. 
This dissertation uses Institutional Theory (IT) to analyze the changing patterns of 
Chinese regional economic inequality after 1949. 
        Analyzing economic data and political documents with IT, the dissertation shows 
that changes in Chinese political institutions, including political parties, policy-making 
agencies, and institutionalized ideologies, affected these two changes in regional 
inequality after 1949.  
        The dissertation concludes that IT is necessary and sufficient to explain the shifts of 
regional inequality in post-1949 China; that is, the changes in political institutions 
influenced economic institutions which in turn affected economic outcomes. Moreover, 
this dissertation also indicates that IT may also be useful to explain regional inequality in 
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                                                        Chapter One       Introduction 
China has developed greatly since it launched economic reform in 1979. The average 
annual growth rate of the Chinese GDP (Gross National Product) has exceeded nine 
percent in the past two decades (Table 1.1).1  Economic progress, however, differs 
greatly across the three main Chinese regions: the Coastal, the Inland, and the West 
(Figure 1).  According to the Chinese Statistical Bureau, the GDP per capita of the three 
regions in 2005 was: the West (9536 yuan), Inland (11493 yuan), and the Coastal area 
(23042 yuan).2
        Chinese regional inequality has not simply grown in a linear way since the 
Communist accession to power over a half century ago. Between 1949 and 1979, 
economic inequality across the three Chinese regions declined, but since the early 1980s, 
such inequality has begun to increase. Table 1.2 shows the changing ratio of GDP per 
capita across the three regions. In 1949, the GDP per capita in the Inland constituted 
about sixty four percent of that in the Coastal area. In 1965, the figure rose to about 
eighty two percent. In 1979, that figure was still higher than that in 1949, while in 2000 
and 2005 respectively, each figure decreased to fifty six percent and forty nine percent. 
The GDP per capita shift in the West shows the same trend. 
  In other words, the per capita income of the Coastal area now is about 
two and half times as that of the Western area.   
 
 
                                                   
                                                 
1 Chinese National Statistics Bureau. Yearbook 2006.  
2 In 2005, one US dollar equaled to about eight yuan. 
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                               Figure 1 Three Geographical Regions of China 
 










        Table 1.1 Chinese Economic Growth in the Past Two Decades (1979-2005) 
Year 1979 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
11.7 7.6 7.8 5.2 9.1 15.9 10.2 13.5 8.8 11.6 11.3 4.1 3.8 9.2 
Year 1992 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
14.2 13.5 12.6 10.5 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8 8.3 9.1 10 10.1 9.9 
Sources: Chinese National Statistics Bureau.    
 
    Table 1.2    The Changing Ratio of GDP per capita across Chinese Regions 
  1949 1965 1979 1990 2000 2005 
Coastal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Inland 0.64 0.818 0.672 0.655 0.56 0.49 
West 0.42 0.71 0.549 0.558 0.43 0.41 
                 Sources: Chinese National Statistics Bureau: Yearbooks. Xia, 2006. Gao, 2004. Wei and Ma 1996. 
 
         According to Albert Hirschman and Gunnar Myrdal, regional inequality is likely to 
increase during economic take-off stage. The authors argue that in developing countries, 
like China regional inequality will widen, as developed areas will have competitive 
advantage in attracting most resources and hence in achieving higher growth rate than 
less developed areas (Hirschman, 1958: 184; Myrdal, 1957: 23-32). 
       Although some researchers show that rural-urban inequality across Chinese regions 
increased in some pre-1979 years and the trend of regional inequality was not smooth, 
they agree that averagely regional inequality in China between 1949 and 1979 had been 
reduced and such inequality began to increase again after the 1980s (Kanbur and Zhang, 
1999, 2004; Wan and Zhang, 2006; Wei and Ma, 1996; Yu and Wei, 2003). Jones, Li, 
and Owen examine Chinese economic inequality at the city level and find that annual 
growth rates of Coastal cities are, on average, three percentage points higher than cities in 
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other areas after 1979 (Jones et al. 2003). Analyzing data at the provincial level, Jian, 
Sachs, and Warner find that inequality across the Chinese provinces increased during the 
period 1965-1979, and provincial inequality began to decrease after 1979 (Jian et al. 
1996). This finding seems to be different with my finding that at regional level Chinese 
inequality during the period 1949 to 1979 had decreased, while the inequality began to 
increase after 1979. I will discuss the seemingly diverged findings in Chapter 2. 
         Indeed, the pattern of Chinese regional inequality is puzzling. Why did Chinese 
regional inequality decrease when it began its economic take-off in the 1950s, and only to 
increase again after 1979?  What are factors that shaped the pattern of Chinese regional 
development after 1949?  What light does this case shed on regional inequality in 
developing nations generally?  This dissertation answers these questions by exploring 
institutions that shaped the path of uneven development in China between 1949 and 2005.   
 
                  Implications of Regional Inequality on the Three Chinese Regions 
        Regional inequality can profoundly affect a country’s political stability and its 
sustainable development. First, large regional disparities can elicit local people’s feeling 
of “relative deprivation” even if they also benefit from the overall economic development 
(Gurr, 1970).  Increasing regional inequality threatens political integration of China, 
because it stimulates political unrest and instability in relatively poor areas populated by 
ethnic minorities. For example, Islamic fundamentalists mobilize supporters in Xinjiang, 
a large Western provincial area with millions of ethnic minority residents, by charging 
the Chinese central government with deliberately suppressing Xinjiang’s local growth to 
serve Han majority’s interests. Radical activists claim without evidence, that the Chinese 
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government willingly extracts raw materials and skilled workers from Xinjiang to other 
areas, and Xinjiang’s development requires secession from China (Chen, 2007).  
        Second, regional inequality can obstruct the integration of a national market, and 
hence future economic growth, in a large country like China. Fearing that local capital 
and technology would flow to developed areas for higher economic return, the Inland and 
West try to reduce the free flow of these resources across regions (Wedeman, 2004: 83-
156). In addition, the Coastal area sells a large proportion of its manufactured goods to 
the West and Inland, so the weak purchasing power in the two areas will choke the 
selling of Coastal products and hence stall the further Coastal development.  
       Third, the Western and Inland areas also provide well-trained workers to Coastal 
enterprises. If the uneven development worsens substantially, local authorities will also 
prohibit the inter-regional flow of human resources. For example, the residential 
registration system (Hukou) authorizes local governments to restrict labor mobility. Local 
governments can also encourage skilled workers to stay home by offering them political 
positions or giving them preferential loans and tax breaks. All these policies distort 
efficient resource allocation across regions and thus hinder China’s development. 
         Fourth, increasing economic inequality has affected the balance of political power 
among national political leaders. The Politburo, the dominant institution in making 
Chinese public policies, allows senior national leaders to retain their regional positions. 
Since the mid-1980s, Politburo leaders from the Coastal area have increased their 
political power because they represent a superior stream of revenues for the central 
government. After the mid-1980s, most Politburo members have been from the Coastal 
area. Leaders from the other two areas often find it difficult to directly challenge their 
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Coastal rivals because regional economic prosperity has increasingly become the main 
standard for evaluating Chinese leaders’ governance. It is thus common that regional 
economic conflicts often extend to the Politburo and affect the making of economic 
policies.   
        In sum, regional inequality vitally affects Chinese political economy. The CCP 
(Chinese Communist Party) and the Chinese central government also believe if they 
cannot reduce the centrifugal tendency in local areas caused or exacerbated by regional 
inequality, China’s national integration will be undermined (Xinhua News Agency, 
2006).  Thus, a better examination of the causes and process of regional inequality is 
essential for understanding China’s current and future development. 
 
           Conventional Explanations for Economic Inequality across Chinese Regions 
        There are several explanations for Chinese regional inequality, but all have difficulty 
in explaining the changing pattern of the inequality since 1949. Some economists argue 
that initially unequal distribution of natural endowments caused unequal development in 
China (Huang, 1990; Wang and Hu, 1999). These scholars argue that the Coastal area 
owns advanced technologies, skilled workers, and a geographic proximity to international 
business, while other regions have comparative disadvantages in these areas. Thus, these 
studies hypothesize that endowments differences engendered regional inequality. These 
researches however do not explain the reason the West and Inland could not effectively 
utilize their comparative advantages such as abundant natural resources and low-cost 
human capital to develop, while the Coastal area could do so.  
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        Second, some politicians and political scientists maintain that international 
structures caused or enlarged regional inequality in China (Mao, 1956; Goodman, 1994; 
Oi, 1992; Wu, 2002).  For example, Mao Zedong maintained that imperialism laid the 
basis of uneven development in China and such inequality could be path dependent. Mao 
maintained that Shanghai and some other Coastal cities had prospered at the expense of 
other areas. These Coastal cities did not help China develop, in Mao and other Chinese 
leaders’ analysis, because they only served the interests of imperialists by extracting raw 
materials to, and importing manufactured goods from, developed countries. Jean Oi and 
Frederic Wu both maintain that the Cold War significantly determined China’s uneven 
development after 1949. They argue the Cold War hindered the Coastal area in engaging 
in international trade and encouraged the CCP to strengthen interior economy as a 
strategic move in confronting with Russia and the U.S.  
        Oi and Wu are partly correct in pointing out that the Cold War pressured the 
Chinese government to pay more attention to the West and Inland. But they downplay 
important evidence that does not support their thesis. First, even during the Cold War, 
China still developed international trade with newly independent countries, most socialist 
states, and Western countries such as France, West Germany, Japan, Canada, and 
Scandinavian countries. Coastal cities such as Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou were still main ports for international trade during the Cold War.  Second, if 
the Cold War was the major factor in impacting China’s uneven development, why did 
Chinese regional inequality began to increase in the early 1980s when the Cold War was 
 10 
still underway?3  Indeed, as following chapters will show, the reduced regional inequality 
before 1979 was resulted from shifting institutions and the implementation of CCP’s 
specific policies to realize the political and strategic goal of “equality”.4
        The third explanation of uneven regional development in China emphasizes cultural 
factors in shaping regional inequality. Cal Clark and C.C. Roy, for example, argue that 
the extent of local adherence to Confucianism helps to explain the difference of economic 
achievement among some developing countries. Those areas that advocate Confucianism 
would develop more slowly because Confucianism opposes the pursuit of material 
interests (Clark and Roy, 1997).
 
5
                                                 
3 The Sino-US relationship began to change in the early 1970s, but Sino-US trade did not fully developed 
until the mid 1980s. Hence, before the mid-1990s the Sino-US trade did not contribute a lot to the 
development of the Coastal area. Technical and financial assistance from the Japanese, Taiwanese, and 
overseas Chinese provided the main source to modernize the Coastal area before the mid 1990s. 
  Yang Zongmei argues that local culture strongly 
affects domestic inequality. Yang observed that people in Shanxi and Guizhou, two 
underdeveloped provinces in the West, thought it shameful to engage in business, and 
they would rather retain their “pure” life style than adopt an entrepreneurial one. Local 
4 In the 1930s, the CCP stressed that all regions should be at the same economic level. Such idea might be 
unrealistic, but it did affect the CCP’s intentions to reduce regional inequality.  
5  This argument is incomplete. Confucianism does not oppose prosperity. What it stresses is to get rich 
legally and morally. Confucianism indeed encourages the pursuit of material interests to realize “Ren” or 
the eternal progress of human beings. The widely referenced misinterpretation of Confucianism might have 
been originated from Max Weber who argued that Confucianism obstructed the development of capitalism. 
But this assertion clearly does not conform to the development history of the Asian Tigers and other East 
Asian countries. Moreover, Weber’s definition of capitalism has been oft-criticized as ethno-centered, 
which is based on experiences in the evolution of capitalism in Western countries. 
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residents in Shanghai and other Coastal cities, however, perceive poverty to be a most 
shameful thing in the world, and as a result they are more likely to work hard or even 
take risks to pursue prosperity (Yang, 2002: 126-66). These cultural identities, according 
to Yang, contributed to the more rapid development of the Coast but low growth in the 
other two regions. The cultural explanation, however, still cannot explain the way 
Chinese regional inequality changed direction twice since 1949. Indeed, if cultural factors 
do partially account for the emergence of regional inequality, they cannot explain shifts 
of such inequality in China when culture adherence is relatively stable across Chinese 
regions.  
        All these explanations downplay the critical role played by Chinese political 
institutions in affecting uneven development in China. Political choices have significantly 
affected uneven development across Chinese regions. For example, neither economic 
evolution nor cultural influences can explain the implementation of the “Third Front” 
project designed by the CCP. The “Third Front” project assumed that during the war, the 
Coastal area was the first front, while other big cities constituted the second front and 
rural and mountainous areas in the Inland and West became the third front. The CCP 
believed that the war would easily destroy Coastal industries, and to maintain China’s 
defense power, heavy industries must be developed in the other two areas. The party thus 
designed the “Third Front” project to develop heavy industries in the Inland and West. 
The project terminated in 1991, but it facilitated economic development of the two 
interior areas. The “Great Leap Forward” movement in the late 1950s offers another 
example of a deliberate policy design. The CCP initiated the movement to reduce the 
perceived power discrepancy between China and its potential rivals, mainly the U.S. or 
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the Soviet Union, by building a modern industrial system in China, especially in the less 
developed Inland and West.  
        The “Third Front” project and the “Great Leap Forward” movement affected the 
uneven development in China as they artificially altered Chinese regional development 
paths. Starting from the early 1960s, the central government shifted investment focus to 
the West and Inland because the Coastal area was perceived to be easily destroyed by 
potential enemies. The CCP also managed to relocate skilled workers and modern 
industries from the Coastal area to the other two areas between 1949 and 1979. All these 
policies reduced regional economic inequality in China.  
        These examples suggest that China’s uneven development owes less to regional 
endowments, international structures, or cultural differences than the existing literature 
suggests. To better understand regional inequality in China, it is necessary to study the 
role played by the shifting Chinese political institutions. 
                                                          
                                                          Central Hypothesis 
        My central hypothesis in this dissertation is that shifts in key Chinese political 
institutions, especially the shifts of CCP’s power structures and policies, affected China’s 
uneven regional development more significantly than other factors. The dissertation 
shows that the shift of Chinese political institutions impacted Chinese regional inequality 





Dependent Variable   
        The Dependent Variable (DV) in this dissertation is the changing pattern of 
economic inequality across the three Chinese regions since 1949. I take several steps to 
accurately measure regional economic differences. First, I use GDP per capita to measure 
economic levels across various areas at a given time period. Second, I also compare 
relative changes in GDP across Chinese regions, meaning to measure the changing ratio 
of GDP per capita across the three regions. Although there are several problems with 
using only GDP to measure economic achievement, it still is the main indicator used and 
accepted by academics and national governments to measure economic growth.6
 
  
Central Independent Variable: Changing Political Institutions 
        The most important Independent Variables (IVs) in this dissertation are fundamental 
or durable changes in formal political institutions, including power shifts among different 
government agencies and party restructuring in 1949 and 1979.  
        In this dissertation, “political institutions” mainly refer to formal institutions such as 
political parties, formal rules, and laws. In China, political leaders sometimes also try to 
execute their will via Ren Zi, meaning governing by individuals rather than laws or rules. 
During Mao’s leadership (1949-1979) and Deng’s governance (1979-1992), top leaders 
                                                 
6  For example, scholars argue there are three basic standards to evaluate economic development. The first 
one is Nozik standard, which argues that the process of economic development should be just. The second 
is Rawls model, maintaining that economic development should at least not achieved at the expenses of the 
poorest groups. The third one is Varian criterion, positing that a real economic development should make 
every citizen satisfied by what he/she gets and will not jealous of the others’ situation (Walters and Layard, 
1978). But it is still very difficult to measure the subjective indicators as these scholars suggested.  
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also tried to build Ren Zi but failed because institutions did not develop as they expected, 
meaning leaders had to be constrained by institutions.   
        Political institutions matter because they help to determine the path and transaction 
cost of social activities via two mechanisms: first, they provide a basic context in which 
these activities takes place; and second they determine the scope and rules under which 
various activities can be carried out. 
        Durable shifts of political institutions can increase or reduce regional inequality. 
Political scientists Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek define political development as 
“a durable shift in governing authority.”  They refer “governing authority” to the exercise 
of control over individuals or things that are designated and enforced by the state. By 
“shift” they mean “a change in the locus or direction of control, resulting in a new 
direction of authority among persons or organizations within the polity at large or 
between them and their counterparts outside”. The term “durable” suggests “that the 
distribution of authority is not fixed and that its stability or change in any given historical 
instance must be regarded as contingent” (Orren and Skowronek; 2003:123).  
         The process of American economic development illustrates the way durable shifts 
affected regional inequality in a country. In 1876, Reconstruction ended and Republican 
candidate Rutherford Hayes became the president. This shift strengthened the U.S. 
government’s commitment to three economic policies that facilitated uneven regional 
development in the U.S.: the political construction of a national market, the adherence to 
gold standard, and tariff protection for industry (Bensel; 2001:1-18). The political shift 
marked by the bargain of 1876 resulted in policies that intensified economic differences 
among the Northeast, Midwest, and the West.  
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        There have been at least two fundamental shifts of political institutions in China in 
the last sixty years. The first shift in 1949 endowed the CCP authoritarian power to 
develop China’s economy with a socialist development model. First, the party assumed 
that to realize equity among the people, the central government had to design policies that 
assured each social stratum and geographic area to converge to the same economic level. 
Second, the fear of potential war with the U.S. or Soviet Union pressured the party to 
transfer huge amounts of capital and other resources from the Coastal area to the Inland 
and Western provinces. Third, the preparation for war with other countries in the 1950s 
helped China reduce economic and technological differences across regions. The CCP 
assumed that if the sudden attack from the U.S. or Soviet Union destroyed the central 
government, each region should be able to engage in war independently. To do so, each 
region had to build heavy industries and maintain productive capacities deemed essential 
for economic and military independence. Institutionalized ideology also affected policy-
making between 1949 and 1979. For example, Shanghai and other Coastal cities were 
criticized as having been severely influenced by the “debauched Western life-style”.  
Thus, the central government believed it should try to balance the economic power of 
these areas by transferring funds and technologies to inland areas. These policies helped 
Chinese government reshape the unbalanced regional economy and laid a solid 
foundation for future development for the Inland and West. However, such arrangement 
undermined the realization of economic comparative advantage and partially exacerbated 
the effects of some natural disasters, especially the catastrophic famine in 1960 which 
starved millions of Chinese people.                                                      
 16 
        The second shift occurred in 1979 when the CCP began to launch economic reform. 
The post-1979 CCP discarded Maoism and suggested economic development instead of 
the class struggle as the dominant goal of the party and government. The party also 
agreed to act according to laws and rules. The CCP pragmatically acknowledged that to 
develop all the regions simultaneously was unrealistic, and the CCP believed that the 
Coastal area had comparative advantages in capital, technologies, market, and human 
resources, although not in natural resources. Since China could not develop all the 
regions at the same time, resources should first tilt toward these areas that had better 
foundations. The CCP thus designed the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the Coastal 
area in 1979, expecting the Coastal area to develop faster and then help the West and 
Inland develop in the future (Yang, 1991; Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 149-55). The state 
also designed preferential tax and fiscal policies for the Coastal area to facilitate its 
economic development. These policies enlarged economic inequality across Chinese 
regions, because mainly the Coastal area could benefit from these preferential policies.  
        In both 1949 and 1979, fundamental shifts of political institutions contributed to 
economic shift, first toward convergence, then economic divergence. To measure shifts in 
these institutions, I study different versions of laws, changing construction of political 
structures, and institutionalized political ideologies that affected policy-making process. 
These indicators are crucial in understanding the evolution of modern Chinese politics at 





                                                       Alternative Hypotheses  
        To examine the possibility that other factors may play a greater role in shaping 
China’s uneven development, I also examine the alternative hypotheses identified earlier 
in this chapter. The first hypothesis is that natural endowments caused regional 
inequality. I examine this hypothesis by using models based on the Cobb-Douglas 
function, which argues that labor, technology, and capital investment determine 
economic achievement. To strengthen the examination, I also compare other resources 
such as raw materials across the three regions to see whether a greater stock of raw 
materials disproportionately advantaged the new developed regions.  
        The second alternative hypothesis is the change in international structure greatly 
affected uneven development in China. I compare regional inequality during the Cold 
War era when China’s foreign policies and its relations with other countries changed. If 
the inequality changed when international context did not change, or if the inequality did 
not change while international structures shifted, then this hypothesis is not supported.  
        The final alternative hypothesis of this dissertation is that cultural differences caused 
regional inequality in China. I use historical and cultural analyses to examine this 
hypothesis. If cultural difference across regions did not show a large shift, as indicated by 
historical analysis, while economic inequality across regions shifted, the hypothesis 
cannot be sustained.  
           
                                         Methodology and Sources of Information  
        This dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. I primarily use the 
Historical Comparative (HC) approach, a method often used in qualitative studies, for my 
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analysis. The HC is a dynamic and comprehensive approach because it is able to compare 
historical events overtime or across borders (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 93-99).  
         The HC approach examines the hypothesis by comparing the effects of two durable 
changes in Chinese political institutions in 1949 and 1979. First, I compare independent 
variables through historical periods. I specify institutional arrangements and policy 
content before and after each political shift. I also explore differences of assumptions and 
ideologies that came about as a result of these institutional shifts. I compare the changes 
in regional economies that followed these shifts. I mainly check absolute figures of 
economy such as GDP per capita and the percentage of industries in economy through 
different periods, but I also compare relative changes in these data across Chinese regions 
between 1949 and 2005.  
        I collect data from two types of sources. The first one is from government 
documents, including laws, regulations, white papers and statistics issued by the Chinese 
central and local governments. This category of data includes yearbooks and yearly data 
reports published by the Chinese National Statistics Bureau (CNSB) and its regional 
branches. This dissertation also adopted data from other governmental departments, such 
as the Chinese Commerce Department (CCD), the General Customs of China (GCC), the 
Chinese Agriculture Department, and the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the nation’s 
central bank. Moreover, I also review related communist party documents such as party 
annual reports and committee briefs, because the party is powerful in affecting the 
Chinese political economy.  
        This dissertation also uses secondary sources such as related records in books, 
journals, newspapers, and websites. These sources help to understand the way policies 
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and laws were formed and carried out. They can also provide information about the 
process of decision-making at the central government that official documents often do not 
contain. However, one should be very cautious to use such sources because politicians or 
other authors may intentionally add or subtract some materials from their memoirs due to 
political or personal considerations. For example, some officials may exaggerate the 
positive effects of policies they designed or implemented, and they may also intentionally 
underreport mistakes caused by their policies. Political considerations may also cause 
distortions in some memoirs. One example is that the CCP clearly stipulated that any 
severe criticisms against senior leaders are prohibited. Thus, in China it is difficult to 
determine the individuals who initiated specific policies and why they did so.  To address 
this problem, I compare different sources of materials and then choose the data that are 
most close to facts.  This process is to build up Intercoder Reliability, meaning two or 
more analysts, using the same procedures and definitions, agree on the content categories 
applied to the material analyzed. The more the agreement, the less personal biases 
heavily distort the content of the material (Johnson et al. 2001: 257).  
 
                                               Expected Contributions of this Study 
        Incorporating institutional factors into the analysis of Chinese development, this 
dissertation examines political and economic impacts of the two durable institutional 
shifts in 1949 and 1979. The study hence analyzes whether related theories about 
economic development and regional inequality are still applicable to China’s case. 
Specifically, this dissertation explains the way institutions impact Chinese regional 
inequality. This study differs with scholars who posit that economic development is 
predestined by certain economic structures or those who argue that politicians are the 
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main actors in impacting the orientation of economic development. Instead, this study 
explores the interactive functions between political institutions and unequal development 
in China.   
        This new framework uses and develops Institutional Theory (IT). By using IT, this 
dissertation explores the reasons of why in the past five decades the CCP designed and 
implemented some seemingly irrational policies.  In addition, this study illustrates the 
way the change in Chinese political institutions affected economy, at regional or national 
level, making the analysis more complete than previous analyses. 
        In sum, this research helps clarify whether internal politics is crucial in affecting 
Chinese regional inequality than culture, natural endowments, or international structures. 
Specifically, the dissertation examines the role played by Chinese political institutions in 
deciding the shifts of Chinese regional inequality between 1949 and 2005.  
 
                                                    Outline of the Dissertation 
        After introducing an overview of the study in Chapter One, Chapter Two provides 
an overview of China’s regional inequality. This chapter briefly illustrates historical and 
economic background of the three Chinese regions. The chapter discusses regional 
inequality in Chinese history and explains its implications on traditional and modern 
Chinese politics. Chapter Two also illustrates shifts of Chinese economic development 
since 1949, and elaborates on the puzzle of Chinese regional inequality.  
        Chapter Three provides a comprehensive review of scholarship that addresses 
regional inequality. This chapter explores prior and current theoretical works on durable 
shifts of Chinese political institutions and regional inequality since 1949. The chapter 
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concludes that current literature on this topic does not adequately explain patterns of 
regional inequality in China. Thus, IT is suggested to fill the gaps in the literature.  
        Chapter Four explains political institutions and policy-making process in communist 
China. This chapter first details Chinese governmental structures and the CCP and 
analyzes their roles played in economic policy-making. Second, the chapter elaborates 
the relationship between the Chinese central government and local authorities. This 
relationship is crucial in deciding effectiveness of economic policies designed by the 
central government. Third, the chapter discusses laws and rules that are essential in 
affecting the Chinese economy. Finally, the chapter also explores institutionalized values 
and ideologies that impacted Chinese regional inequality. 
        Chapter Five discusses the durable institutional shift in 1949 and elaborates the way 
the CCP and the Chinese government tried to reduce regional inequality. The chapter 
compares the difference between Chinese political institutions before 1949 and after. The 
chapter also argues that Mao’s influence on economic policy-making was significantly 
constrained by institutions. With the help of statistical data, this section evaluates the 
decreasing regional inequality after 1949, showing that institutional factors effectively 
explain patterns of uneven Chinese development during this period better than culture, 
economic history, individual leader’s intervention, and international influences.  
        Chapter Six explores the durable shift of political institutions in 1979 and its impacts 
on China’s uneven development thereafter. The main task of this chapter is to explain the 
mechanism that these new political institutions increased regional inequality, again taking 
culture, economic history, and international influences into account. This section also 
studies the “Developing the West” strategy, designed by the CCP and the Chinese central 
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government in 1998 to reduce regional inequality, and finds that new institutions built 
after 1979 constrained the effectiveness of this policy.  
        Chapter Seven concludes findings of the entire research and summarizes policy and 
research implications. The section concludes that IT is necessary and sufficient to explain 
the shifts of regional inequality in post-1949 China; that is, the changes in political 
institutions shaped economic institutions which in turn shaped economic outcomes. 
Moreover, this section also concludes that IT may also be useful to explain regional 
































       Chapter Two   Changes in Chinese Regional Inequality in Historical Perspective 
 
        This chapter studies the way Chinese regional inequality has been affected by 
political, economic, and international factors across Chinese history. This chapter first 
introduces economic and geographic conditions of the three Chinese regions: the Coastal, 
Inland, and West. Second, the chapter explores internal and external factors that affected 
the tendency of regional inequality in traditional China. Third, the chapter discusses 
regional inequality in Nationalist China. The chapter also briefly introduces the shifts of 
regional inequality in communist China between 1949 and 2005. These introductions 
trace the historical background of the uneven development in China, helping us 
understand regional inequality shifts in post-1949 China. 
 
                                              One China with Three Regions 
         Many studies analyze Chinese inequality at the provincial or city level (Jian, Sachs, 
and Warner, 1996; Jones, Li, and Owen, 2002). They find that during some period before 
1979, Chinese inequality was reduced. These studies also find that after 1979, rural 
inequality across Chinese regional increased. 
        These findings are consistent with the pattern I have illustrated in Table 1.2.  First, 
the findings by Jian, Sachs, and Warner can be mainly explained by their own 
observations; that is, before 1990, much of the average reduction in provincial inequality 
resulted from the strong trend of convergence across Coastal provinces, meaning that 
only the intra-regional inequality might have decreased before 1990 but the inter-
regional inequality might not have decreased at all.  
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        Second, the authors also noticed that Coastal provinces continuously develop faster 
than interior provinces after 1990, indicating that economic inequality between the 
Coastal area and the other two regions has been increasing since then. Susumu Yabuki 
and Stephen Harner also find that although there was a trend of reducing inequality 
across Coastal provinces, economic inequality across the three regions increased in the 
1980s and 1990s (Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 97-99).  
        Third, what Jian, Sachs, and Warner also focus on is that rural reform had partially 
reduced regional inequality in the 1980s. It could be the case. However, it was also 
possible that the increasing difference of industrial product across regions, were too large 
to offset the decreased inequality in agricultural sector, so the net economic inequality 
across Chinese regions would still increase (Jian, et al. 1996; Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 
93-102; 149-69). 
        Fourth, even the temporary increase in rural-urban inequality in 1959 and 1960 was 
strongly correlated with a short-period fiscal decentralization in 1959, supporting my 
argument in the following chapters that Chinese institutions significantly affected 
Chinese regional inequality (Lardy, 1979: 124-32; Wei, 2000: 48-50). 
        Finally, sample size may influence research results. Jian, Sachs, and Warner’s 
analysis is based on provincial data, but my analysis of Chinese economic inequality is at 
the regional level, which is mainly determined by two factors. The first and most 
important reason is to reach the contribution of public policy to inequality. During the 
past several centuries, macroeconomic policies designed by the Chinese central 
government were based on regional level (Skinner, 1977: 211-20, 1985; Li, 1996; 
Hendrischke and Feng, 1999: 4). Second, the change in intra-region administrative units 
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may also distort data analysis at the sub-regional level. For example, Chongqing, one 
provincial area, had been a city under Sichuan province till1997, while Hainan province 
was a city-level area under Guangdong province before 1988. In addition, the Chinese 
central government shifted some cities from one province to another in the past decades, 
and many new cities were only established after the late 1950s, so I do not analyze 
inequality at the city level as Jones, Li, and Owen did.   
        Therefore, my analysis deals with the regional level. This dissertation classifies 
mainland China into three regions endowed with different natural and social resource 
endowments: the Coast, Inland, and West (Table 2.1).   
 
        Table 2.1.    The Administrative Units of the Three Chinese Regions 2005 
 
The West The Inland The Coastal Area 
Sichuan Shanxi Beijing 
Guizhou Heilongjiang Tianjin 
Yunnan Jilin Hebei 
Shaanxi Anhui Liaoning 
Gansu Jiangxi Shanghai 
Qinghai Henan Zhejiang 
Ningxia Hubei Fujian 
Tibet Hunan Jiangsu 
Xinjiang  Guangdong 
Chongqing  Hainan 
Inter Mongolia  Shandong 
Guangxi   
                        Data Source: Chinese National Statistics Bureau (CNSB) 
 
The Coastal Area 
       The Coastal area is mainly constituted by river delta and scattered low hills. The area 
occupies about only about twelve percent of China’s total land area but contains more 
than half of Chinese population (Chinese National Statistical Bureau [CNSB], 2001). The 
land and environment in this area is well-suited to intensive agriculture as long as labor 
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and capital are available (Cheng, 1985).  The Coastal area also enjoys the geographical 
proximity to international trade because with many ports along the long coast. Chinese 
history also recorded that Coastal residents formed and entrenched the norm of openness 
and economic aggressiveness (Gu, 2001; Gu, 1998). Thus, although the Coastal area 
lacked many natural resources for development, its geographic proximity to foreign trade 
helped it modernize after China had to reluctantly open door to Western countries after 
the Opium War (1839-1842). 
 
        Table 2.2   Regional Distribution of China’s Major Mineral Resources (%) 
 
Mineral Coastal area Inland Area Western Area  Inland and the Western 
Areas 
Chromium 12.5 7.1 80.4 87.5 
Iron 47 27.9 25.1 53 
Manganese 8.8 21.9 69.3 91.2 
Gold 27.6 47.5 24.9 72.4 
Silver 24.1 45.3 30.6 75.9 
Nicker 0.8 9.8 89.4 99.2 
Lead 25.6 31.1 43.3 74.4 
Zinc 21.3 31.6 47.1 78.7 
Copper 10.5 37.2 52.3 89.5 
Bauxite 4.4 58.8 36.8 95.6 
Phosphorus 8.5 38.1 53.4 91.5 
Data Sources: Chen, 1996; Joseph, and Zhang, 1999.  
 
  
       From 1839 to 1949, the Coastal area was well ahead of the other two regions because 
it had well-developed industries and agriculture. The Coastal area continued to lack some 
necessary resources for industrialization during the pre-1949 period, and had to import 
these resources from the other two areas (See Table 2.2). In addition, the Coastal area 
was able to attract a well-educated labor force from other two areas with higher wages. 
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The Western Area 
 
        Much of the huge Western area is mountainous. The West also has limited arable 
land with low annual precipitation, obstructing the development of intensive agriculture 
in this area (Zhao, 1994). The Western area contains about seventy four percent of total 
Chinese land, but only about nine or ten percent of the Chinese population lives in this 
area (CNSB, 2001). 
         The two great rivers in China, the Yellow River and the Yangtze River, originate in 
the mountainous areas in the West. The abundant water resource in the West enables it to 
develop hydroelectric power. In addition, the area also has abundant oil, natural gas, and 
Coal, which are necessary for industrialization (Table 2.3).   
 
           Table 2.3   Regional Distribution of Energy Resources in China (%) 
   
Energy Resources Coastal area Inland Area The West 
Hydroelectric Power 7.5 14.7 77.8 
Coal 5.3 56.2 38.5 
Oil 43.8 40.5 15.7 
Natural Gas 21.9 6.9 71.2 
Data Sources: Chen, 1996. China Association for the Study of Natural Resources (CASNR) ed. 2001. 
Joseph and Zhang, 1999.  
 
        Indeed, in traditional China, whoever controlled the Western area had an advantage 
in controlling other Chinese areas.  This was because the Western area had plateaus at a 
higher altitude than the other two regions, so that ancient armies in this area could easily 
attack the other two regions but effectively resist the other two regions’ attack by 
controlling the choking points into the West (Shima, 1986; Gu, 1998).  When barbarians 
controlled this area, they threatened the security of the central government. Thus, to 
secure political control of China, some Chinese dynasties established capitals in the West 
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and laboriously imported resources from other two regions. Chinese dynasties which built 
their capitals in the Inland area would also assign a large number of soldiers to the West 
(Gu, 2001). To reduce financial burden, the central government ordered these soldiers to 
cultivate arable land in the West, a practice which facilitated Western growth. 
 
The Inland Area 
        The Inland area contains plains and mountains with an elevation of between one 
thousand to two thousand meters. This area has abundant arable land and natural 
resources such as coal, copper, and iron ore. The Inland area used to be the bread basket 
of China and it still produces a large amount of cotton, rice, wheat, and tea due to the 
favorable climate, nourishing soil, and powerful irrigation system in this area (Qi, 1999).  
After 1840, the Inland area exploited its natural resources to gradually build some 
industries, including textile and tobacco factories, iron and steel companies, lumber 
firms, and firms that cultivated coal, iron ore, gold, and other minerals (Shi, 1989; Yan, 
2001). 
        Many Chinese dynasties were established in the Inland area because the abundant 
Inland resources offered powerful assistance to those dynasties to control the entire 
China. The Inland area had a developed educational system, relatively developed 
transportation, and a cultural adherence to traditional Chinese norms, which in turn 
attracted elites from other regions.  During the traditional era, most Chinese leaders arose 
from this area and would often make favorable fiscal and tax policies for the Inland 
region. All these factors had consolidated the leading status of the Inland area in Chinese 
politics for almost one thousand years (619 to 1644).   
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                          Regional Inequality in Traditional China (before 1839)  
        The physiography of Chinese regions does not entirely determine the relative 
prosperity of each region’s economy. Other factors, such as political intervention and 
economic policy, also affected China’s regional development.  
        Economic inequality across Chinese regions is a historical phenomenon and has 
changed several times. During the fifth century BC, the Inland area was the economic 
center of China in that the Zhou dynasty and several successive dynasties had 
transformed this area into a political center and extracted huge resources from other 
regions. The cultural advantage of the Inland area also helped it to attract well-educated 
labor force and investments which reinforced its economic superiority. The satellite 
kingdoms perceived the conquering of this hinterland as a crucial step in controlling the 
whole of China. When a Western kingdom, Qin, conquered other six major kingdoms 
located in the Inland and Coastal areas, it intended to transform the West into a political 
and economic center by transferring resources from other Chinese regions. The West Han 
Dynasty maintained this policy until its downfall in the early first century A.D. (Shima, 
1986; Qian, 2007: 111-26). During the following five centuries, economic centers in 
China shifted. The Southeastern area, which previously was deemed as culturally and 
economically underdeveloped, made much economic progress when large number of 
citizens escaping incessant Inland civil wars immigrated to this area. When China’s 
powerful dynasty Tang was established in 619, it made every effort to develop the West 
where the Chinese national capital was then located (Zhu, 1993; Qian, 1997: 415-22). 
Interregional roads and canals were built under the guidance of the Tang government to 
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convey necessary resources to the West. The central government also levied heavy taxes 
on other areas, especially the Yangtze Delta, to support Western development (Ouyang, 
et al. 1981; Zhu, 1993). Nevertheless, because of the over-cultivation of land and the 
deterioration of local environment, economic growth in the West began to decrease in the 
mid-eighth century.  
        In the beginning of the tenth century, the Inland area (or Zhongyuan), once again 
became the economic and political center of China. Transportation facilities and 
agricultural skills were greatly improved in Zhongyuan due to the Song government’s 
effort. The Song government also established many schools in the Inland which provided 
well-educated human capital for economic development. The government even created 
specific financial agencies to develop regional commerce (Zhang, 2005: 78-98; Deng, 
2007: 128-86). Nevertheless, this regional ascendance did not last long. In the early 
twelfth century, central China’s economy was almost destroyed by continuous invasions 
from northern nomadic tribes. After the twelfth century, the relatively peaceful 
Southeastern area became the most developed region in China due to continuous 
government investment (Chi, 1936; Qian, 2007:623-26). 
         External and internal factors contributed to these shifts. The rapid development of 
the South in the eighth and twelfth century was affected by external shocks, especially 
aggressions on Northern China by northern nomadic tribes, which moved economic 
growth to the South.  The ever-developing financial system in the South and Southeast in 
the late sixteenth century, for example, also consolidated growth in these areas.  
        Specific government policies hindered Coastal development before the nineteenth 
century. Most traditional Chinese governments, for example, forbade Coastal residents to 
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build or own ships, fearing that they collaborate with foreigners. The Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644) enacted laws to punish any Coastal residents who would dare to engage in 
foreign trade (Zhang, 1981).  The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) also ordered residents along 
the Coast to move fifty miles inside to prevent them from assisting foreigners, especially 
the Japanese, smuggle contraband or weapons into China (Xie, 2006: 218-66). These 
laws made it difficult for the Coastal area to fully employ its geographic advantages in 
foreign trade, although navigational and shipbuilding technology in China was well 
developed during the period from the twelfth to the seventeenth century (Qian, 2007: 
830-32).  
        Despite these limits, the Coastal region still developed agriculture, handicraft plants, 
and domestic trade. Intensive agricultural technology and advanced irrigation systems 
were developed in this area in the early twelfth century. The relative infrequency of war 
in the Coastal region also helped it amass enough capital and skilled workers to further 
develop its economy. The area attracted abundant resources, whether by governmental 
financial transfers or private investment, and developed at a faster rate than that of the 
other two Chinese regions.  
 
                              Regional Inequality in Modern China (1839 to 1949) 
        External factors increasingly impacted Chinese regional inequality between 1839 
and 1949.  The Opium War (1839-1842), which broke out between China and Britain 
after the Chinese Qing government punished British businessmen who smuggled opium 
into China, fundamentally changed the Chinese regional economy. Before the war, there 
was only one licensed port in China for international trade; and there were strict limits on 
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the volume of foreign trade, and on trading partners. For example, the Chinese 
government stipulated that only thirteen government-controlled companies could deal 
with foreign trade and the total amount of annual imports were also strictly regulated. 
The Qing government believed that China did not need foreign goods, and deemed 
foreign trade as a political tool to retain the political hierarchy system with China as the 
center while other countries as the periphery.7
        Therefore, the Chinese economy was not influenced much by external factors before 
the Opium War. However, after 1840, the Qing government lost a series of wars to 
France, the Britain, the U.S., Russia, and Japan.  The treaties followed the wars forced the 
Qing government to open more trading ports to foreign countries (Li, 1996).  All these 
ports were located in the Coastal area or along the Yangtze River. This shift changed 
Chinese economic geography, with the Coastal area benefited greatly from foreign trade 
and became the most developed area. Coastal cities like Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao, 
Dalian, Amoy, and Hong Kong developed rapidly and became growth centers in the 
Chinese economy (Rawski and Li, 1992). 
  In most cases, only countries that were 
classified by the Chinese government as “civilized” could be granted the rights to do 
business with China. 
        The trade potential of Coastal area significantly affected major Western countries’ 
policy toward China by increasing their stake in this region of the country. During the 
Taiping Revolution (1851-1864), a revolt launched by some Chinese Christians to oppose 
                                                 
7 Traditional China built a center-periphery system in East Asia and foreign trade was used as an effective 
way to control small countries that needed Chinese products. If small countries obeyed Chinese orders, they 
would get very preferential trade term, while those violators would elicit trade sanctions from China. 
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the corrupt Qing government, Western countries at first declared neutrality and would not 
support either side. When the rebels, who proposed the appropriation of private property, 
marched to the Coastal area, Western countries immediately helped the Qing government 
suppress the rebellion to protect their own interests (Li, 1996; Qian, 2007: 871-77).   
        During the first two decades in the twentieth century, the Coastal area steadily 
developed export-oriented industries.8
         The Qing government’s successor, the Nationalist (KMT) government, had planned 
to develop the West and other poor Chinese areas. In 1923, Dr Sun Yat-Sen in his The 
Strategy of Building a New China (Jian Guo Fang Lue) laid out a detailed plan to 
develop the West assuming that a centralized government were able to solve regional 
inequality in China (Sun, 1986). Nevertheless, China dissolved into several warlord-
controlled regions between 1912 and 1928. Each region did build some weaponry or war-
related factories, but this fell far short of industrializing. 
  The Coastal area imported raw materials from 
other Chinese areas and produced industrial goods mainly for export.  
        In 1928, the Nationalist Party declared the unification of China under the control, 
but some areas were still controlled by local elites. The KMT government designed a 
comprehensive plan to develop China. The government incorporated the development of 
the West and Inland into this policy agenda, but it gave preference to the Coastal area 
because the government believed this relatively developed area was a foundation for 
developing the entire Chinese economy by attracting needed capital and technology from 
Western countries. This strategy later was criticized by KMT’s political rivals, including 
                                                 
8 In this regard, China was increasingly, although somewhat reluctantly, tied to the international economic 
and political system. 
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the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and some intellectuals, as a policy to serve 
international capitalists’ interests. With this strategy, however, China grew steadily 
between 1928 and 1936, holding an average annual growth rate of 6.5 percent 
(MacFarquhar, 1991). During the eight-year period, all three regions developed rapidly, 
but regional inequality in China enlarged with the Coastal area grew faster than the other 
two regions. 
        Before and during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), the Nationalist government 
made a great effort to develop the Inland and West, trying to fortify them as reliable war 
bases. The Chinese central government began to reallocate Coastal factories, machines, 
capital, and well-trained workers to the Inland and West in the mid-1930s (Chen et al. 
2006: 186-89). Historians estimated that about one third Coastal industries, with their 
machines and workers, were successfully reallocated to the hinterland before the full-
scale war broke out in July 1937. More important, many Coastal universities had also 
been moved to the West, helping the area acquire a more competitively labor force for 
local economic growth.9
        When the Sino-Japanese war ended in 1945, the Nationalist government once again 
started to encouraging Coastal growth.  The Coastal area, especially the Yangtze Delta 
and the Perl Delta region, received major capital investments.  The CCP, which was 
powerful in the West and Inland, criticized the KMT for serving the Coastal area’s 
interests while neglecting the backwardness of the other two regions. The CCP enhanced 
its power during the eight-year Sino-Japanese war and began to challenge the KMT’s rule 
  The reallocation of resources to the interior areas before and 
during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) motivated the two regions’ industrialization.  
                                                 
9 This was mainly motivated by patriotism among Chinese intellectuals. 
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after 1945. The civil war between the CCP and the KMT, mainly waged in the West and 
Inland, continued for four years (1945 to 1949) and almost destroyed the economy of the 
two regions.10
        By 1949, when the KMT lost the civil war to the CCP and fled to Taiwan, huge 
regional economic discrepancy had already entrenched itself in China, with the Coastal 
area most developed and the West least developed. About eighty percent of modern 
industries were concentrated in the Coastal area (Dong, 2005a). Other areas functioned to 
provide the Coastal area with primary goods or raw materials and to purchase Coastal 
goods.  
  The war had less impact on the Coastal economy, so the government as 
well as private investors shifted most of their resources to this relatively peaceful area, 
which enhanced Chinese regional inequality.   
 
                      The Shifts of Regional Inequality in Communist China (1949-2005) 
        When the CCP won the war and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in 1949, it inherited a nation that had been tortured by decades of continuous wars. 
Believing that an unindustrialized China would be easily invaded and humiliated by other 
countries, the party decided to industrialize China as quickly as possible. Worrying that 
the Coastal area would be most easily attacked by foreign powers, the CCP focused on 
developing the other two regions (Gao, 2003; Dong, 2005a; Lu, 1990; Yang, 1997:15-26; 
Yang, 2001). This decision was mainly based on political and military considerations by 
the CCP, but it also reflected economic requirements of China’s industrialization.  
                                                 
10 Some battles were also engaged in the Coastal area, but it ended immediately and did not bring severe 
damage to industrial bases, a goal that expected by the CCP. 
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       Between 1949 and 1976, averagely the PRC directed about sixty percent of its 
investment on average to the West and Inland regions (Bo, 1998; Gao, 2003).  By 
administrative orders, the government also assigned experts and well-trained workers 
from the Coastal area to the West and Inland. Moreover, the poor transportation system 
had obstructed economic transactions between the interior and Coastal area (Bo, 1998). 
Hence, the Chinese central government also greatly improved transportation facilities in 
the two areas (Pang, 1984).  Because of these policies, the West and Inland developed 
faster than the Coastal area and regional inequality significantly reduced during the pre-
1979 period, although some authors find that the trend of regional inequality was not 
smooth before 1979 (Kanbur and Zhang, 2004).  
        Chinese regional inequality again increased after 1979.  Believing that Chinese 
regions could not develop at the same pace, the CCP and the Chinese government altered 
its development strategy in 1979. The party and the government thought the Coastal area 
could develop faster because it owned solid industrial basis, highly trained workers, and a 
geographic proximity to international market (Xiong, 2005; Yang, 1997: 26-39).  
Advocated by senior leaders, such as the CMA (Central Military Association) chairman 
Deng Xiaoping and the National Planning Committee chair Chen Yun, the CCP and the 
Chinese government designed preferential policies such as tax breaks and progressive 
government investment for the Costal area. Numerous Coastal cities were gradually 
defined as Special Zone Areas to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and advanced 
technologies. The government also reduced financial assistance to the less efficient State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the West and Inland, putting the two areas’ economy at 
further disadvantage (Gao, 2003; Yang, 1997: 28-36).  
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                                                               Conclusion 
         Historical dependence, resource dispersion, specific geographic features, and 
administrative arrangements divide China into three regions: the Western, the Inland, and 
the Coastal area. Regional inequality has existed for most of Chinese history. The West 
and Inland took turns as the most advanced area in traditional China. However, after 1840 
the Coastal area became the most developed region as China, and has been increasingly 
involved in international businesses.  
        After the CCP came into power in 1949, China experienced two changes in 
economic inequality across the three regions. The first change reduced the regional gap 
with the Inland and West developed faster than the Coastal area during the pre-1979 
period. The second shift again consolidated the leading status of the Coastal area in the 
Chinese economy and enlarged regional inequality after 1979. The following chapters 






















               Chapter Three   Alternative Explanations of Chinese Regional Inequality  
 
        This chapter explores theoretical frameworks that have been used to explain regional 
inequality between and within nations. This chapter reviews economic, political, and 
cultural explanations of regional inequality. Economic analyses offer basic models for 
studying regional inequality, but they cannot satisfactorily account for shifts of Chinese 
regional inequality. Existing political models are useful in illustrating the process of 
Chinese regional inequality shifts, but they are weak to explain causes and mechanisms 
that engendered such shifts. Cultural explanations help us understand some features of 
Chinese institutions, but they overstate cultural effects in shaping Chinese regional 
inequality and cannot explain the shifts of such inequality. In short, these frameworks are 
incomplete in explaining the two changes in regional inequality in post-1949 China. 
        This chapter introduces Institutional Theory (IT), showing it can provide an 
effective approach to analyzing the shifts of regional inequality in post-1949 China.  
First, IT helps fill in the gaps left by existing theoretical frameworks when applied to the 
case of Chinese regional inequality. Second, IT incorporates the merits of economic and 
political explanations and offers a dynamic analysis of the changes in Chinese regional 
economic inequality in the post-1949 period. 
 
                                   Economic Explanations of Regional Inequality 
        Economists have offered several explanations of regional inequality. Classical 
economic theorists such as Frederic List, William Perry, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith 
argue that regional differences of natural endowments determine economic achievement 
of a region or country (Gilpin, 1987: 12; 181-182). These economists maintain that 
 39 
countries or regions with abundant endowments are more likely to advance faster than 
countries or regions with poor endowments.  
        This model assumes that absolute economic advantage will help the economic 
development of nations. According to classic economic theory, comparative advantage 
could allow a resource-scarce nation or region to develop faster than other areas if it has 
specific production or international trade advantages. David Ricardo detailed comparative 
advantages of Britain and Portugal to show this process. Although Portugal was at a 
disadvantage to England in natural endowments, it could still focus its production on its 
relatively abundant endowments and benefit from trading with Britain. Such beneficial 
trade could occur because of the opportunity cost of production; that is, Britain could 
produce its most advantaged goods while Portugal could produce its least disadvantaged 
goods, and trade could increase the total wealth for both countries (Ricardo, 2004).   
        This simplified economic model has deficiencies in explaining changing regional 
inequality such as that observed in China. The model ignores the changing context and 
the emergence of new technologies that affect comparative advantages. The model also 
assumes no hurdles to international or interregional trade, but tariff and non-tariff barriers 
are very common in the real world.  In addition, the model presupposes that productive 
factors such as technology, skilled workers, and capital, are immobile across countries, 
but productive factors regularly move across borders.  
        Indeed, existing endowments do not fully determine a nation’s prosperity; instead 
the way a nation or region takes advantage of such opportunities shape its prosperity. The 
rapid development of Japan after World War II shows that effective development policies 
may have a much greater impact on prosperity than natural endowments. Japan has 
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limited natural resources to sustain its rapid economic growth. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Israel also lack natural resources but all have attained substantial economic achievements. 
Their success must depend on other factors, such as peaceful international context or 
effective domestic policy, which are obviously not included in the natural endowment 
model.  
        As to regions inside one country, the relative comparative advantage of each area 
may help to explain regional economic differences, but does not determine that areas with 
fewer assets will lag behind other areas. The development of Xinjiang province in China 
supports this point. Before 1949, Xinjiang was believed to have few natural resources and 
was severely underdeveloped. With the help from the Chinese central government, 
however, Xinjiang successfully initiated its economic growth after 1949. Although 
Xinjiang was technically behind other Chinese areas, the central government helped the 
area extensively develop agriculture, especially the production of cottons, grain, wheat, 
and grape. The area also established some heavy industries with financial and 
technological assistance from the central government. By 2005, Xinjiang had become the 
most developed province in the West. This case shows that effective policies can 
overcome the natural endowments deficiency in regional development.11
        The second and most recent economic explanation of regional inequality is the 
Ladder-Step Doctrine (LSD), which argues that due to economic constraints, domestic 
  
                                                 
11 The original intention of the Chinese government to cultivate Xinjiang was to ensure tight control over 
the area, which was dominated by ethnic minorities such as Urs, Kazak, Kyrgyzs, and Hui, officially 
became a Chinese province in 1884. To effectively suppress any uprisings from ethnic minorities, the 
Chinese government since 1884 had relocated millions of Han residents from other Chinese areas to this 
new province and established paramilitary units in Xinjiang (Wang, 2004). 
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regions have to develop gradually from the center to the periphery. Albert Hirschman 
suggests that it is unrealistic for a poor nation to develop all its regions at the same time. 
However, some areas or cities, which enjoy more economic or political advantages, can 
develop early. The “trickle-down” effect of the developed area will eventually push the 
development of other areas, so that regional inequality can be reduced in the long run.12
       Another economic approach to explaining uneven economic development is the 
“Inverted-U” model proposed by Simon Kuznets. This model argues that regional 
inequality in a developing economy may enlarge initially because of polarization effects 
but will decrease later as economic development diffuses to other areas. Hence, the 
process is like an “Inverted-U” as Kuznets suggested (Kuznets, 1955). In China, the most 
developed cities are seen by this school as “engines of growth” or “growth poles”, and all 
regions will be fully developed in the future when Coastal growth will trickle down or 
spillover to the interior (Dong, 1999; Yang, 1997: 27-28).  
  
Hirschman argues that for a country to attain high economic growth it must develop 
several regional centers with economic strength (Hirschman, 1958).  
        German scholar Walter Christaller introduces another economic model--the “central 
place” theory. This theory argues that there a hierarchy of central places and nested 
market areas in a country, and that this hierarchy accounts for regional inequality. 
Christaller maintains that the tradeoff between economy of scale and transportation cost 
pressures producers to cluster into discrete geographic areas. The concentration of 
                                                 
12  This effect means the slow but continuous technology and investment transfer from developed area to 
the underdeveloped region as the marginal cost of using the matured technology or investment in developed 
area increases (Hirschman, 1958). 
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producers allowed “central regions” to boom, putting them at the top of economic 
hierarchy of that country (Christaller, 1933).  Christaller’s model clearly illustrates the 
hierarchical structure of economy in some countries, but this model cannot explain the 
shifts in Chinese regional inequality during the past five decades. According to 
Christaller, the “central area” could retain its dominant status indefinitely (Christaller, 
1933). But in China, the Coastal area had been politically and economically marginalized 
by the Chinese central government before the late 1970s because the expected wars with 
other countries would easily destroy the Coastal area.  Hence, this model is incomplete in 
explaining the change in Chinese regional inequality.  
        There is no purely economic model for explaining the way regional inequality shifts 
or persists. John Friedman points out that the “trickle down” effect can only exist 
theoretically as several factors obstruct the reducing of economic inequality across 
regions. Two factors, the failure of the market to efficiently allocate resources and the 
inability of underdeveloped areas to adapt appropriately to the socio-economic changes, 
significantly affected regional inequality (Friedman, 1966).  
        Roland J. Fuchs and George Demko point out another problem in the LSD model. 
The relative wealth of the most developed areas attracts skilled workers from other 
regions, thus reducing human capital, one important factor to economic growth, in less 
developed areas (Fuchs and Demko, 1979:315-16).  In addition, according to the LSD 
model, the development of interior areas should be smooth and gradual. The history of 
Chinese regional growth, however, does not show a smooth linear development across 
the three regions as this model has suggested. Both the West and Inland have experienced 
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rapid development for a period after 1949. Again, a major problem of the LSD model is it 
ignores the role played by government in regional modernization.  
         The third economic explanation argues that international trade and FDI (Foreign 
Direct Investment) essentially shape regional economic inequality. This model argues 
that the Coastal area engages more intensively in foreign trade and attracts most FDI, 
helping the area more developed than the other two areas. As Table 3.1 shows, for 
example, the Coastal area has enjoyed much advantage in engaging export and attracting 
FDI, and hence it is much developed than the other two areas.  
 
        Table 3.1   Shares of Regions in Total FDI Inflows and Total Exports in 2002 
Region %  of Total FDI Inflow in 2002 % of Total Exports in 2002 
Coastal 85.2 91.7 
Inland and West 14.8 8.3 
Sources: Chinese National Statistics Bureau (CNSB).   
 
        There are several problems in applying this model to the Chinese case. First, the 
model does not tell us the causality of FDI, trade, and economic development; that is, it 
can be the advanced economic development that facilitated exportation and FDI inflow 
instead of the vice versa. Second, the model does not tell us what policy has made the 
Coastal area much more attractive to FDI after 1979. Third, the theory cannot explain the 
reason that Chinese regional inequality only began to widen after 1979. The model is 
insufficient to explain why China’s increasing international trade with other countries 
before 1979 did not enlarge Chinese regional inequality. We have to ascertain whether 
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geographic proximity in foreign trade, as Shen, Wong, Chu, and Feng argued, is the 
significant factor that influenced Chinese regional inequality (Shen et al, 2000).   
        During the pre-1979 period, China still had extensive economic communications 
with many countries. The major Coastal cities, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Amoy, 
Tianjin, Dalian, Ningbo, and Qingdao served as international trade ports. The Coastal 
area also attracted huge investments from, and engaged extensively in trade with, the 
Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, Australia and Japan. Nevertheless, on average, 
the Coastal area did not develop faster than the interior area during the pre-1979 period, 
entailing that international trade and FDI alone were still insufficient to account for 
changes in Chinese regional inequality (Naughton, 2004: 379-80).  
        A fourth economic explanation of regional inequality highlights differences in the 
concentration of manufacturing centers (Krugman, 1993; 1995; Johnston, 1999). The 
“Manufacturing Zones Framework” (MZF) model argues that the three manufacturing 
zones in China, which situated in Northeast, Southwest, and Southeast China 
respectively, drove regional inequality. Richard Auty also argues that the concentration 
of Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) greatly affected China’s regional inequality as 
HCIs promoted host area’s productivity and induced investment to related industrial field 
that supply services and components to HCIs (Auty, 1992: 418-94).   
        However, the three manufacturing zones or HCI zones cannot account for patterns 
of regional inequality in the Chinese case. Liaoning province in Northeastern coastal area 
concentrated about thirty five percent of manufacturing productivity in the 1950s, but for 
two decades since the late 1950s Liaoning province had been less developed than many 
inland provinces. Another problem is causality. In modern China, the level of 
 45 
manufacturing concentration in each region was the result of economic development 
rather than the opposite. Moreover, the shifts of manufacturing zones did not in tandem 
with the shifts of regional inequality in modern Chinese history (Yang, 1997: 15-42). 
        Han Sunsheng and Clifton Pannel find that privatization has significant geographic 
consequences in China, which partly explains Chinese regional inequality (Han and 
Pannell, 1999). This research provides a new perspective of studying the shifting Chinese 
regional inequality after 1979 by exploring the change in property rights in various 
regions. The paper finds that the Coastal area was authorized to foster the development of 
private property rights after 1979 while the other two regions were constrained in 
fostering private property rights. The difference of private property rights in the three 
regions hence affected regional economic inequality. These authors, however, do not 
prove the causation between regional difference of private property rights and regional 
economic inequality, so they do not exclude the possibility that it is economic inequality 
that caused different levels of private property rights across regions. More important, 
these scholars do not answer the prior question of why property rights were changed.  
        William G. Skinner (1965: 195-228, 363-99) and Albert Feuerwerker (1963: 53-63) 
argue that transportation facility has been a crucial factor in affecting Chinese regional 
inequality. They argue that Coastal growth was caused by the area’s increasing economic 
interaction with foreign countries. Dwight Perkins also argues that the poor transportation 
facility constrained the development of the West and Inland in the long run, although it 
helped the two areas’ economy survive external shocks (Perkins, 1975).  
        These models identify a useful dimension of regional inequality, but they have at 
least two problems. First, they cannot account for initial economic situation of Chinese 
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regions. That is, they cannot explain why the Coastal area had enjoyed a higher growth 
rate despite its closure to foreign trade before 1842. Second, the model cannot explain the 
reason that regional inequality still enlarged after the 1980s while interregional 
transportation facilities had been greatly improved.  
        Finally, some scholars argue that regional inequality is a historical phenomenon and 
is path dependent. They argue that developed regions are more capable in attracting 
investment because investing in the developed area has less default risk and higher 
expected returns (Harris, 1954; Lowry, 1964; Pred, 1966).  Thus, capital holders prefer to 
invest in the developed region, making rich regions develop faster. 
        The main problem of this historical account is it cannot explain why economic status 
of each region in Chinese history changed twice after 1949 if the cumulative effect of 
regional economy is irreversible. Some other elements, besides economic factors, must 
exist to influence Chinese regional inequality after 1949.  
        In sum, although economic theories can partly explain the formation of regional 
inequality in China, they cannot explain the shifts of such inequality after 1949.  
 
      International Relations and Domestic Politics Explanations of Regional Inequality 
        Political scientists also have tried to explain Chinese regional inequality in four 
different ways. The first explanation of regional inequality mainly comes from 
International Relations (IR) scholarship. IR argues that in the contemporary world, no 
country can isolate itself from the influences of world politics and economy while 
capitalism shapes the world system. IR posits that the expected conflict with other nations 
affects a country’s economic policy and hence patterns of regional inequality. For 
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example, the Cold War pressured the Chinese government to transfer resources from the 
easily attacked Coastal area to the Inland and West in the 1960s (Chen, 2006). This 
school also argues that the soaring Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) after 1979 decisively 
contributed to the rapid development of the Coastal area, and greatly enlarged Chinese 
regional inequality. This explanation points out external factors that impacted Chinese 
regional inequality, but it leaves unclear domestic mechanisms that channeled those 
external factors into influencing Chinese regional inequality.  
        A second explanation, which is mainly advocated by socialists, argues that Chinese 
regional inequality was the intentional design of imperialism. Supporters of this theory 
argue that China before 1949 was not really an independent country. The imperialist 
countries decided, directly or indirectly, which area should develop faster. This model 
argues that to pursue higher returns, imperialist countries invested intensively in the 
Coastal area, which facilitated Coastal development (Li, 1996). 
        It is true that foreign investors before 1949 were more likely to invest in the Coastal 
area, which had a better economic basis and higher investment return rate than that of the 
other two regions. This pattern motivated the Chinese government to make preferential 
policies for the Coastal region. Nevertheless, the model is limited in helping understand 
Chinese economic growth during the post-1949 period when only limited foreign capital 
flowed to the Coastal area.  
         A third more recent approach argues that Chinese local governments shape regional 
inequality. Political scientist Chung Jae Ho classifies three kinds of local responses to 
central economic policies: pioneering, bandwagoning, and resistance (Chung, 2000). 
Pioneering areas initiated some innovative development policies, and then built support 
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for their efforts, which in turn pressured the central government to acknowledge the 
legality of local policies. Other provinces jumped on the bandwagon to avoid possible 
political or economic risks for initiating policies. To protect local interests, some 
provinces resisted policies issued by the central government. For example, some Western 
and Inland provinces in the 1980s often refused to implement the entire open door policy 
because their economic assets were insufficient to deal with possible competition. The 
various attitudes and strategies advocated by local areas thus influenced local policy-
making and local growth, which in turn impacted Chinese regional inequality (Chung, 
2000; White, 1995).  The main problem of this explanation is it begs the question why the 
central government chose to allow local innovation after 1979.  
        The fourth framework argues that domestic regime reforms and subsequent policy 
changes determine shifts in the Chinese regional development. This approach holds that 
in 1979 Chinese politics changed dramatically, greatly impacting China’s regional 
growth. Advocated by moderate Chinese leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, 
and Zhao Zhiyang, the CCP and the Chinese government during the post-1979 era shifted 
regional development focus towards the Coast area (Baum, 1994: 225-227).   
        This model is the most promising approach because it begins to consider 
institutional factors that might have affected Chinese regional inequality. The model is 
still insufficient because it mainly focuses on preferences or ideologies held by top 
leaders and underestimates the effects of important institutions such as the CCP and the 
changing power balance between the central and local governments that strongly altered 
Chinese regional inequality in the past several decades. 
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        In short, works by current political scientists are helpful in explaining intentions or 
process of shifts of Chinese regional inequality, but they are still not enough to explain 
institutional and dynamic mechanisms that engendered the two shifts of Chinese regional 
inequality during the post-1949 period. 
 
                                      Cultural Explanations of Regional Inequality 
        The last set of explanations emphasizes cultural factors, positing that the difference 
of Chinese regional culture shaped each region’s behavior and hence determined the 
economic level among these regions. For example, Yang Zhongmei argues that different 
subcultures of Chinese regions strongly affected Chinese regional inequality. Yang 
maintains that the Coastal culture emphasizes hard work, while cultures in the other two 
areas believe that enjoying leisure is a more important part of one’s life (Yang, 2003). 
Tim Oakes studies the interaction between provincial behaviors and local culture and 
argues that cultural factors significantly affect regional economic achievement (Oakes, 
2000). Gu Zuyu and Gu Yanwu, experts in ancient China, also maintained that the 
difference of subcultures across Chinese areas contributed to regional inequality (Gu, 
1998; Gu 2001). 
        Although these cultural explanations can be helpful to understand some institutional 
features in local Chinese areas, it is insufficient to explain the two changes in regional 
inequality in post-1949 China. First, it is almost impossible to empirically test these 
qualitative explanations. These theories are similar to Max Weber’s cultural determinism 
in explaining economic development by highlighting the cultural role played in economic 
growth (Weber, 2001). However, Chinese culture is a constant, while patterns of Chinese 
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regional inequality have varied since 1949. Culture thus cannot sufficiently and 
necessarily explain what caused shifts of regional economy in Chinese history when 
subculture across regions remained constant.  
 
                                  Institutional Theory (IT) and Regional Inequality 
        To supplement previous explanations, I draw on the Institutional Theory (IT) as an 
analytic tool to analyze the changes in Chinese regional inequality after 1949.   IT defines 
institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990: 3). According to IT, 
human beings constructed institutions, deliberately or unintentionally, to maximize 
potential benefits and reduce transaction costs. 
        IT classifies institutions as two types: formal and informal, both of which, I 
hypothesize, are crucial for understanding and explaining the path of Chinese regional 
inequality. I further hypothesize that formal institutions greatly impacted Chinese 
regional inequality since 1949 because they produced specific policies and mechanisms 
that first shrank and then expanded Chinese regional inequality. 
        According to Douglass North, institutions structure incentives in human exchange, 
“whether political, social, or economic” (North 1990: 3).  Institutions provide “the basic 
structure by which human beings throughout history have created order and attempted to 
reduce uncertainty in exchange” (North 1990: 118). Institutions also define the scope of 
human activities by affecting the possible transaction cost of human activities through 
formal laws and regulations or through value systems widely accepted in society.  
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        One important type of formal institutions is rules, laws, or related policies designed 
by the government or the dominant power. According to Lance Davis and Douglas North, 
there are three forms of government behaviors that may affect the rate and scope of 
economic development: a specific law that proscribes or permits a particular institutional 
arrangement; a general enactment that proscribes or permits a range of possible 
institutional arrangements; and a law that defines the legality of actions (Davis and North, 
1971: 27).  Jack Knight also points out that governmental policies or rules may have 
strong distributional effects, whether or not they increase economic efficiency for the 
society (Knight, 1992).  
        Informal rules are established and widely accepted norms in society that govern 
people’s actions. Although these norms may not be in written form, all people know them 
and act according to these norms, or they will be marginalized by the society.  
        Such institutions and institutional changes contributed to the shifts of regional 
inequality in post-1949 China despite the economic, political, and cultural continuity 
across the three regions. These institutions and institutional changes changed transaction 
cost that determined Chinese regional development. The “Great Leap Forward” policy in 
the late 1950s, for example, helped the West and Inland develop but suppressed 
economic growth of the Coastal area. The “Special Economic Zone” policy implemented 
after 1979 encouraged the development of the Coastal area (Yang, 1997: 26-39). 
        IT can help address the gaps in understanding the changes in Chinese regional 
inequality since 1949 that are not fully explained by economic, political science, or 
cultural theorists. First, it helps to comprehensively illustrate the mechanisms that drive 
economic changes. The analyses of institutional games among different participants are 
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crucial in understanding the way some policies were made at specific times rather than at 
other times, and how these policies specifically affected outcomes (Downs, 1957; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1962). Economic theories may stress the cost-and-
benefit trade-off in the market, while political studies mainly focus on the role played by 
political parties. IT incorporates merits of the two analyses by simultaneously exploring 
the cost-and-benefit aspect and political institutions that affected decision-makings. IT 
thus helps to clarify context, behaviors, decisions, and outcomes. 
        Second, IT can help us analyze shifting relations between economic and political 
factors that are essential for shifts in regional development.  Chinese political institutions, 
for example, have extensively determined the operation of the market. The state not only 
provides needed goods such as security and transportation for the market, it also defines 
transaction cost of goods and services in the market by laws or political orders. For 
example, each Chinese local government in the mid 1980s had the power to forbid the 
entry of non-local goods to the local market, which undermined the formation of an 
efficient national market and thus China’s economic growth (Wedeman, 2003). Such an 
institutional arrangement also reduced the effectiveness of policies designed by the 
central government aimed to reduce regional inequality. 
        The CCP and the Chinese government use institutions to promote or inhibit markets. 
For example, political rewards can discourage or encourage market, driving economic 
development and thus affecting regional inequality. During Mao’s leadership (1949 to 
1979), although realizing political goals had higher priority than economic growth, the 
central government would still promote local officials in the Inland and West to develop 
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their local economy (White, 1998; Yang, 2001).13
         Therefore, Chinese politics and markets strongly influence each other. Chinese 
political institutions directly controlled economic activities by stipulating which actions 
are allowed or prohibited. The market exerted its influence via the price system and set 
constraints on political leaders or parties. For example, the party and the central 
government, irrespective of their political preferences, had to deal with economic 
recession during the late 1950s. When the nationwide famine starved millions of citizens 
in 1960, the CCP had to temporarily allow the free market to revive in rural areas in 
exchange for political support from the grudging cadres and masses (Yang, 2001).  
  Since the late 1980s, local leaders who 
had achieved a higher local economic growth rate would more likely to get promoted, 
encouraging local governments to develop local economies (Yang, 2001).  
        Third, IT also analyzes the “path dependence” mechanism to explain the trajectory 
of structural changes. Path dependence means that previous structures or institutions can 
determine the trend of structural changes in the future. It also indicates that even if 
previous institutions are inefficient, they may still be retained because of the four self-
reinforcing mechanisms, as defined by Brian Arthur: large fixed costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations (Arthur, 1988: 10). Large fixed cost acts 
like a threshold to obviate the initiation of small challenges, and the unit costs decrease as 
output increases. Learning effects improve product quality or reduce product costs. 
Coordination effects confer advantages to cooperation with other economic agents who 
                                                 
13  Mao died in September 1976 and his supporters “the Gang of Four” were arrested by moderate leaders 
in October 1976, but the major political institutions were kept intact until the end of 1979. This dissertation 
thus defines the closing year of Mao’s leadership as 1979. 
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are acting in the same way. Adaptive expectations mean that the accepted beliefs of the 
current arrangement elicit beliefs of further prevalence. These four mechanisms together 
strengthened the power of current options and suppressed the possibility of taking 
alternative options that lack these advantages. The four mechanisms thus build a lock-in 
for adopted arrangement; that is, once the solution is taken it is difficult to exit.  Arthur’s 
model is powerful for accounting for institutional changes in China because it explains 
that the institutional strength of the CCP allowed it to alter the priorities of regional 
economic development. Although Chinese institutions were considered by many as 
inefficient in the past decades, they still dominated China’s economic development due to 
the entrenched lock-in system resulted from the four mechanisms suggested by Arthur. 
After 1949, it was impossible for another political regime to replace the communist 
governance because the CCP forbade the existence of any other political parties. Party 
propaganda helped it mobilize strong support from the masses. The well-built party 
system in the CCP successfully coordinated activities of party branches. The CCP also 
gradually improved its governance by learning from its own experiences. The four 
mechanisms hence well explain whatever policies the CCP might take and whatever 
resulted from these policies in the past several decades.  
        In sum, to fully understand the reasons, processes, and outcomes of Chinese regional 
economic changes in the past decades, researchers have to study the way Chinese 
political institutions affected two such economic shifts in regional inequality. IT, 
accordingly, provides a framework for understanding shifts of economic development, 
and for Chinese regional economic inequality.  
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                                                               Conclusion 
        This chapter has analyzed alternative theoretical frameworks that may be able to 
explain changes in regional inequality in post-1949 China. Economists propose several 
explanations about regional inequality, but they cannot account for both changes in 
regional inequality in post-1949 China. International relations theorists and some political 
scientists effectively analyzed external context that contributes to the change in regional 
inequality in post-1949 China, but these explanations do not account for the mechanisms 
of such change. Cultural explanations argue that different regional values elicited 
different behaviors in each region, which indirectly affected Chinese regional economic 
inequality. But they are still insufficient to explain the abrupt changes in regional 
inequality between 1949 and 2005 when culture was held constant across the three 
regions. Finally, the chapter shows that IT offers a powerful alternative model for 
explaining political and market mechanisms that had affected regional inequality in 




















Chapter Four   Political Institutions and Chinese Regional Development  
in Post-1949 China 
 
        This chapter discusses political institutions which impacted patterns of Chinese 
regional inequality during the post-1949 period. I first analyze economic influences of 
Chinese political institutions on regional inequality. Second, I specify government 
institutions and market mechanisms that were crucial in driving these institutional 
changes.  Third, I analyze key political institutions in post-1949 China, particularly the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the constitutional relationship between the central and 
local governments, and official laws and rules. These formal institutions provided legal 
context for Chinese regional development during the post-1949 era. In addition, this 
chapter also discusses informal institutions such as institutionalized norms and values 
that also affected the making and implementation of policies that shaped the tendency of 
regional development in post-1949 China. 
 
             Political Institutions and Their Economic Implications in Post-1949 China  
        Chinese political institutions during the post-1949 era affected the path and outcome 
of Chinese regional economic development in six ways. First, Chinese political 
institutions provided public goods for regional development. Between 1949 and 1979, the 
CCP and the Chinese government directly allocated about one third of the nation’s entire 
investment in developing transportation, public schools, and hospitals in the Western and 
Inland area, which facilitated the two areas’ growth.  
         Second, political institutions in post-1949 China allowed the government to regulate 
the economy extensively through the operation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or 
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governmental purchasing, which endowed the government substantial power to 
manipulate the economy. Before the late 1970s, the CCP also established party branches 
in each SOE. SOEs such as Beijing Iron, Dongfeng Vehicle, Daqing Oil, and Taiyuan 
Heavy Machinery, etc, not only produced commodities under the guidance of the CCP, 
but also helped the party govern. Many SOEs during Mao’s leadership were organized as 
military units, and workers were grouped into para-militia groups. In Western and Inland 
areas, administrative committees of SOEs also acted as police departments or councils. 
This situation began to change only after the mid-1980s (Chu, 2003; Yang, 2001).  
        Third, Chinese political institutions after 1949 set the legal context for economic 
activities by issuing and enforcing series of laws,  including the Law of Land, the 
Enterprises Law, the Law of Investment, and the Regulation of National Planning. These 
laws defined which kind of economic activities was legal and specified the extent to 
which the state would encourage different types of economic behavior. These laws 
stipulated that all productive resources, including land and capital, belonged to the state 
and only the National Planning Committee (NPC) had the authority to arrange 
production. Local enterprises must act according to rules and orders issued by the NPC. 
Believing that the free market challenged the communist doctrines, the CCP also 
prohibited the free market before 1979; officially sanctioned collective economic 
activities, meanwhile, received every support from the government. Beginning in 1979, 
however, the CCP altered institutions to encourage marketization to fuel economic 
growth (Baum, 1994: 66-69; Yang, 1997).  
        Fourth, political institutions in post-1949 China directly affected regional growth by 
increasing or decreasing transaction cost of many economic activities. For example, 
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before the early 1990s it would be very difficult to get a license for starting a company in 
many Chinese areas. It was also common for local governmental agencies to use 
extorting so that private enterprises and investors routinely had to bribe local officials to 
circumvent the slow bureaucratic process (Yang, 2001).14
        Fifth, political institutions in post-1949 China designed policies to affect regional 
economic development. The CCP and the central government in the 1950s, for example, 
had designed the “scissor gap” policy to intentionally suppress prices of agricultural 
products and to increase industrial goods’ prices to amass enough capital for China’s 
further industrialization (Pang, 1984).
  
15
        Finally, the centralization and decentralization of Chinese political institutions 
during the post-1949 period affected the trend of Chinese regional inequality. The 
centralized or decentralized power structure directly affected the authority of local 
regions and subsequently determined regional economic achievements. The centralized 
system between 1949 and 1979 stipulated that regions could not design policies for 
regional development but only to implement policies designed by the central government. 
  Starting from the early 1950s, the Chinese 
government and the CCP also initiated the Five Year Plans (FYPs) to streamline the 
Chinese industrialization, although the effectiveness of the FYPs during each historical 
period varied (Dong, 2003 a and b; Pang, 1984; Yang, 1997).  
                                                 
14 He Qinglian also argues that the cost of bribing officials constitutes a large proportion of the total 
business cost for private enterprises. Yang Xiaokai’s research shows similar result (He, 2005; Yang, 2001). 
15  The term “scissor gap” was coined by the Russian revolutionary leader Trotsky to refer to the enlarging 
price gap between agricultural and industrial goods. Trotsky suggested increase prices of industrial 
products but suppress prices of agricultural goods, helping the Soviet government amass capital from 
agricultural sector to support industrialization. 
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In such a centralized regime, regional governments did not have sufficient incentive to 
develop their local economies. When decision-making was decentralized after 1979, 
regional governments were motivated to develop local economies using material rewards. 
Therefore, areas that had more economic advantages could develop faster than those that 
lacked these advantages. 
        To explain interaction between Chinese governmental institutions and the market, 
and the effects of this interaction on regional inequality, it is necessary to consider 
several vital institutions in post-1949 China. These institutions include the CCP, dualism 
that defines the power relationship between the Chinese local and central government, 
formal laws and rules, and some vital institutionalized norms. 
 
                The Chinese Government and Chinese Regional Inequality after 1949 
        Understanding uneven economic development among regions in a nation like China 
requires an explanation of governmental mechanisms that drive the regional economy to 
develop at different rates. As economist Walt Whitman Rostow argues, in many cases 
“the initial impulse to economic modernization is generally seen to arise from basically 
non-economic motives.” Rostow maintains that the driving force of economy often 
originates from the government, which is more powerful than the market to induce 
technology importation (Rostow, 1971:3-4).  
        Governmental forces may foster economic development by decreasing costs of some 
economic transactions. The government, for example, may guarantee political stability 
that markets need to thrive. The government issues laws to help citizens protect their 
property and designs policies to encourage investment or technology acquisition. The 
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government also provides necessary public goods, such as transportation facilities and 
national defense, to propel economic growth. In addition, government spending can also 
fuel economic growth.  
        Not all government behaviors, however, are helpful for economic growth. Some 
governmental activities increase transaction cost of certain economic activities, and 
consequently limit economic growth. Heavy taxes, for example, obstruct the development 
of national enterprises. Government regulations may also lead to inefficient provision of 
goods. For example, North argues that policies designed by the Spanish royal government 
undermined that country’s long-term competitive advantage (North, 1990). Yang Xiaokai 
compares the patent law system in Britain and France in the eighteenth century and 
concludes that Britain achieved higher technological level due to its better designed and 
implemented patent laws (Yang, 2001).  
         What the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government did between 1912 and 1928 
provides a clear example of the way that political institutions shape economic growth. 
Scholars claimed that the KMT government protected the interests of social elites at the 
expense of the Chinese masses and obstructed Chinese economic development.16
                                                 
16 In this dissertation, contemporary China refers to the period after 1919.  
 The 
KMT government frequently trampled private property rights to serve the interests of the 
party or party leaders (MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1971). In addition, Chinese investors 
often had to pay higher taxes than foreign firms because the Nationalist government 
wanted to garner more revenues but dared not to offend foreign powers. Local 
government often extorted Chinese businessmen or pressured them to hire officials’ 
incompetent relatives. The KMT government often charged violators as intending to 
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overthrow the government or trying to avert taxes. Many allegations were false, but 
convictions of these small property owners were almost inevitable because judicial 
system was controlled by the KMT. To avoid political and legal problems, Chinese 
businessmen often had to bribe Nationalist officials. These institutions hence increased 
transaction cost of Chinese investors, putting them at further disadvantage in competing 
with foreign companies (Wang, 1995: 12, 76-89). The concentration of social wealth in 
the hands of very few social elites, mainly senior officials, also limited the development 
of an effective Chinese market because the demand was mainly focused on luxury goods 
while the purchasing power from the masses remained very low.       
 
      The Chinese Communist Party ----The Key Political Institution in Post-1949 China 
        The CCP is the most important institution in determining China’s economic 
development. The Chinese Constitution states that the CCP is the founder of, and hence 
the “sole governing party” in, the People’s Republic of China. The CCP is a “proletarian 
party based on the worker-peasant coalition” and “represents the interest of all Chinese 
people” (The People’s Congress of China, 1982). In traditional China, the emperor was 
the source of authority and the representative of the nation; in post-1949 China, the CCP 
plays a similar role in managing political and social issues. 
        To control the country effectively, the CCP transformed itself into a systematic 
governing entity after 1949. At each government level, the party committee had the final 
decision power (Teiwes, 2000). Local party committees controlled local government 
agencies and were responsible for its upper committees and finally were responsible for 
the national Politburo (Yabuki and Harner, 1999). The national Politburo, which usually 
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comprised five to nine standing members, was the ultimate authority on important issues 
such as designing foreign policies, appointing senior officials, and making important 
economic policies (Yabuki and Harner, 1999).  The decisions made by the Politburo must 
be transmitted to the National Congress, a nominal legislative branch, and to be 
publicized as laws or administrative orders.  
        Unlike political parties in democratic countries, the legitimacy and authority of the 
CCP is not based on popular votes, but is generated from its revolutionary achievements. 
The CCP was established in 1921 but it was suppressed by the KMT after 1927 and most 
communist partisans were executed by the KMT government. The CCP finally 
established rural bases in northern Shaanxi (Shaanbei), a poor area in the Northwest of 
China, in 1936 (Wang, 1995). The CCP claimed it sincerely represented the interests of 
the masses, and it successfully mobilized continuous support from poor peasants and 
unemployed city residents. The KMT government, which mainly served the interests of 
urban businessmen and large landlords in the rural area, had tried to annihilate the CCP 
by encircling Shaanbei with about half million well-trained and equipped soldiers.   
         However, the Japanese invasion in 1937 helped the CCP to grow. Chinese local 
elites urged the national KMT government to unite all Chinese power to resist Japanese 
aggression. The KMT then legalized the CCP and ordered the Red Army to engage in the 
war against the Japanese. The increasing corruption of KMT officials during the Sino-
Japanese War (1937—1945) provided great political opportunities for the CCP to build 
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popular support, especially in the West and Inland.17
        The CCP defeated the KMT during the civil war between 1946 and 1949.  To 
mobilize wide support from peasants and poor urban residents, the CCP alleged the KMT 
government as the lackey of the “American Imperialism” because the KMT had 
intentionally developed the Coastal area but let the Inland and West underdeveloped 
(Wang, 1995). Intensive Coastal development, the CCP argued, mainly served the 
interests of Western countries and helped them exploit the Chinese people. This strategy 
helped the CCP mobilize support from the poor, especially Chinese peasants, by 
promising them a patch of private land or stable employment (Wang, 1995). The KMT 
finally lost the civil war in 1949 and fled to Taiwan.  
  The CCP successfully enlarged its 
army during the war to more than one million well-trained soldiers (Wang, 1996; 
Spencer, 1998). In addition, with series victories in guerrilla wars against the Japanese 
invaders, the CCP also reoccupied a large bulk of rural area that had been occupied by 
the Japanese. Thus, at the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the CCP had significantly 
enhanced its power by building solid trust in rural areas, especially in the Western and 
Inland areas.   
         Once in power, the worker-peasant coalition consolidated CCP’s deep penetration 
in the Chinese society and strengthened the party’s advocacy of populism before 1979 
(Tsao, 1987). Since the CCP defined itself as the representative of the masses and the 
rural population constituted more than eighty percent of the Chinese total population, it 
                                                 
17 Some historians argue the war began in 1931 when the Japanese attacked the Northeastern area of China, 
but conventional scholarship thinks 1937 as the starting year of the war when the KMT government 
decided to stage a full-scale resistance against the Japanese aggression.  
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tried to develop its support in rural areas. Thus, for many years before 1979, the CCP had 
believed that economic inequality among the three Chinese regions undermined its 
peasant base in the two interior areas and hence became a political threat to the 
legitimacy of the party. When making policies to develop regional economies, the CCP 
had to ensure that these policies would not enlarge inequality among the regions. 
        After 1979, however, the CCP began to emphasize its urban constituency, especially 
to cities in the Coastal area. The CCP after 1979 argued that populist policies 
implemented between 1949 and 1979 had greatly limited China’s development because 
they did not conform to economic laws of efficiently allocating resources. Thus, the CCP 
proposed that China could develop faster by allowing resources to move to more 
productive areas--the Coastal cities (Pang, 1984; Wei and Ma, 1996).  
       The CCP essentially determined Chinese economic development after 1949. Before 
the late 1990s, the party did not only control economic resources via SOEs or collective 
farms, it also supervised all governmental agencies. Since then, privatization and foreign 
investment have weakened the party’s direct control. In 1999, for example, about seventy 
percent of investment was from non-state investors (Deng, 2001). The CCP, however, 
also controlled most banks, especially the People’s Bank, and retained the authority of 
taxation (Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 159-79). 
        The CCP hence dominated the government and thus defined the legality of all 
economic activities after 1949. At each level of the government, the CCP decided policy-
making via the party council (The CCP also decided the essence of related laws or 
decrees in regulating the economy, which nominally were issued by the National 
Congress (Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 33-39). Most government officials were required to 
 65 
be party members and each local government should not only follow the orders from 
upper level governments but also were required to responsible to local party committees. 
The party council helped the CCP control the state tightly before the late 1990s; but it 
also caused inefficiency as local officials and bureaucrats frequently shirked their 
responsibilities to the central government.  
         As an authoritarian party, the CCP institutionalized many important political ideas 
and social norms in China between 1949 and 2005. To strengthen the party’s governance, 
the CCP tried to define norms and values of the society. The CCP defined socialism and 
Marxism as dominant values in Chinese society and forbade competing values to emerge. 
The CCP stipulated that all people should serve national interests; that is, each individual 
person’s activities should conform to collective interests of the nation. The CCP also 
stressed the role of the central government instead of regional or local functions. The 
public educational system instructed the people, at least in form, to accept norms 
advocated by the CCP. Doctrines of socialism and Marxism, for example, are tested in 
most admission exams from middle school to post graduate institutions. In addition, 
Chinese laws also ordered that each government official should advocate principles of 
socialism, a basic requirement for his or her future promotion.  
        These institutionalized social norms, in turn, constrained policy options for the party 
and the government. The gradual publicizing of the free market in post-1979 China 
provides a good example.18
                                                 
18 The labeling of political goals or events was important in traditional china because it was a discursive 
power of politics and affected the legitimacy of related policies.  
  To address concerns of party hardliners or workers who 
strongly believed that the market was an evil, the CCP had to label the market system as 
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“socialist economy with some free market” when it decided to initiate economic reform 
in 1979.  In 1987, the party changed the name as “socialist planned commodity 
economy”, which still stressed the dominant role of SOEs in the Chinese economy 
although non-collective economy was allowed.  In 1992, the party termed the market 
system as “socialist market economy with different forms”, which maintained the equal 
status of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises (Yang, 2004: 7). In 1998, the CCP 
defined the “market economy with Chinese characteristics”, which allowed the free 
market with some governmental adjustments. In 2002, the CCP stipulated that private 
enterprise owners could become party members, and private property rights would be 
deemed legal by the new Chinese Constitution.19
        In sum, the CCP continued to significantly impact Chinese economic development 
and regional inequality even though the party diminished its direct involvement in 
economic affairs after 1979.  
  These changes show that the CCP and 
the Chinese government gradually chose the market as the means to adjust economy in 
post-1979 China; and direct regulations over regional inequality, as the CCP and the 
government did during the pre-1979 era, were not preferred. 
 
                Dualism---- Power Balance between the Central and Local Governments   
        Political dualism is a second institutional factor that shapes Chinese regional 
inequality. In this dissertation, political “dualism” means the power balance between the 
                                                 
19 In China, a CCP membership means the higher likelihood of building good relations with the government 
or acquiring personal promotion in the future, entailing more material interests. The recruit of capitalists 
into the party therefore is actually a material reward.  
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two coexistent political entities—the local and central government in China. Dualism is 
important in Chinese political economy for several reasons. First, dualism shapes the 
scope of governance of the central government. The central government may allow local 
governments some discretionary authority to deal with local affairs.  Most Chinese local 
governments, for example, have the power to develop local economy and levy local 
taxes. Dualism also defines local governments’ authority to control local resources, hence 
impacting the growth of local economy. 
        Second, dualism also influences the effectiveness of policies designed by the central 
government because local governments are the agents that implement these policies. 
Dualism may cause conflicts between the central and local government because the two 
entities may have different interests and preferences (Nee and Mozingo, 1983). The 
central government has to negotiate with local governments in exchange for their 
effective implementation of national policies (White, 1998: 81-83). For example, after 
1979, local governments could retain a percentage of national taxes they levied, 
facilitating them to effectively carry out national taxation policies (Wong, 2003: 6-22). 
        Third, dualism also denotes that the central government sometimes lacks sufficient 
power or incentive to resolve regional conflicts. As Andrew Wedeman and Yang Xiaokai 
pointed out, the weak coordination of the Chinese central government, accompanied with 
the fiscal and budgetary decentralization after the 1980s,  intensified the irrational “trade 
war” across Chinese regions in the 1990s (Wedeman, 2003: 93-101; Yang, 2001).  
Therefore, dualism on the one hand increases the efficiency of governance, but on the 
hand it may elicit conflicts among various authorities in a country and thus reduce policy 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
 68 
        Dualism is a legacy of traditional Chinese politics. Historically, the central Chinese 
government was never able to fully control sub-national governance. Traditional national 
Chinese leaders experienced this governance dilemma. In periods of weak central 
governments, local governments often had much more power to pursue local interests. 
Even a powerful central government often had to adopt local suggestions, because local 
or provincial governments had more direct or clearer knowledge of the localities and they 
were expected to implement policies designed by the central government. Local or 
provincial units might also initiate or experiment with potentially risky policies. If the 
outcome was desirable, then the central government would incrementally expand the 
implementation of the policy to other areas. If the policy failed, the central government 
could still limit losses (Yang, 2001).  
        Indeed, an effective central control over China requires that the central Chinese 
government give local government substantial political power. One example was the 
Qing government’s suppression of the Taiping Revolution (1851 to 1864).  When the 
central Qing government found it difficult to suppress the revolution with the national 
army, it had to allow local governments to build military forces to defeat the 
revolutionaries. Chinese local governments retained the power to recruit soldiers and levy 
taxes even after the Qing government collapsed in 1911 (Qian, 2007: 886-88). With local 
warlords effectively controlled many provinces, the KMT and the central government had 
never effectively united China during the period 1912 to 1949.  
        After the CCP united China in 1949, the central government also had to struggle 
with local power and interests. The CCP incessantly tried to curtail local powers but 
found that local governments and bureaucrats often shirked their responsibilities. The 
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CCP would firmly punish deviant local leaders or local bureaucrats who were ineffective 
in realizing central government’s will, but often found it difficult to find agencies to 
execute such punishment. The CCP and the central government had to acknowledge that 
dualism was a fact of Chinese political economy (MacFarquhar, 1999). 
        In post-1949 China, local and provincial governments played an important role in 
pushing the design of effective central policies (Huang, 1990; White, 1998: 81-83). 
Because of their regional biases, local officials’ demands aimed to benefit their region 
disproportionately. For example, Coastal provinces preferred low resource prices but 
higher product prices, while inland provinces often sought higher resources but low price 
of manufactured goods from the Costal area. The central government had to frequently 
balance these conflicting demands. This fact showed that local or provincial influences 
could be powerful for shaping Chinese economic growth during the post-1949 era, 
although the central government still retained great power in economic policy-making. 
         The strategic exploitation of dualism affected changes in Chinese regional 
inequality, both before and after 1979. When the central government decided to equalize 
local economies before 1979, it reduced regional autonomy via political orders, mass 
movements, and ideology indoctrination, to tilt the balance of power to the central 
government. When the central government gave more power to local governments and 
reduced its control over regional economic policy-making after 1979, regional gaps 
enlarged. Some areas could develop faster than others with inefficient local policies or 
poor economic bases (Yang, 1997; Wei, 2000). In Chapter Five and Six, I detail the way 
specific policies changed political and economic dualism and hence affected regional 
inequality in China between 1949 and 2005. 
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                        Laws and Rules that Affected Regional Inequality in China         
        In principle, the central Chinese government designs all the nation’s laws and rules, 
affecting Chinese economic development. In practice, the CCP controls the policy-
making process, which determines the form and substance of these laws or rules, while 
provincial and local governments implement many of them. Laws and rules have to get 
approval from the CCP before they are officially issued.  
        The CCP issues laws and rules to govern China effectively. Official media, 
especially the newspaper RenMin RiBao (People’s Daily or RMRB) and CCTV (The 
Chinese Central Television), are important for publicizing and proposing laws and rules. 
These laws and rules can constrain senior leaders’ personal interference. For example, 
during the pre-1979 period, Mao often found his personal orders could not be carried out 
at all if theses orders deviated from formal laws or rules (Yang, 2001).  
        Between 1949 and 1979, the CCP and the Chinese central government designed 
specific laws and rules to reduce regional inequality. One example was the making of the 
Five Year Plans which designed a detailed blueprint to push China’s economic 
development and to reduce regional differences in wealth. Laws and rules affected the 
shift of Chinese regional inequality. When the CCP tried to reduce regional inequality in 
1952, it first issued the Five Year Plans (FYPs), which regulated the progress of Chinese 
regional development by defining investment and growth rate of each area (Pang, 1984). 
The CCP and the government also set up other plans, such as the “Develop the Northwest 
Plan” and the “Third Front Project”, to reduce regional inequality in the 1960s. All these 
plans were written laws or government orders, which instituted the legality of those 
policies to change Chinese regional inequality during Mao’s leadership. The CCP and the 
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central government made FYPs every five years and stipulated that leaders’ personal 
preferences should be excluded from these plans.  
        After 1979, the Chinese government believed that technically laws and rules would 
improve the CCP’s governance and could help China develop faster. Therefore, many 
laws and rules were updated in the early 1980s to drive economic growth (Yang, 2001).  
However, interventions from senior leaders were greatly reduced. Chinese top leaders, 
including Deng Xiaoping, after 1979 found themselves more constrained than before by 
laws because there was no individual leader with the charisma that Mao once had (Baum, 
1994; Yang, 2003). Due to the fading influences of political ideologies, these new laws or 
rules also provided pragmatic and effective support for Chinese development. For 
example, series of laws and rules were issued to support the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) policy after 1979, which established a legal and stable context for the unbalanced 
regional development in China (Yang, 1997). 
        In sum, the main function of these laws and rules is to limit personal interference 
from political leaders and to provide an institutional context for effectively implementing 
central policies designed to develop China’s economy.   
 
              Informal Institutions and Their Economic Implications in Post-1949 China 
         Informal institutions also play a major role in shaping Chinese regional inequality 
because they affect the making and implementation of related policies. According to 
North, informal institutions include conventions and codes of behavior (North, 1990: 4). 
In the absence of the state or other formal institutions, informal institutions become “a 
dense of social network leads to the development of informal structures with substantial 
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stability” (North, 1990: 37).  Informal institutions are important in the society because 
“the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of 
behavior, and conventions” (North, 1990:36).  
        Informal constraints such as conventions and social norms can lower transaction 
cost by decreasing uncertainty among actors (Axelrod, 1986; North, 1990).  For example, 
Chinese people’s loyalty to their hometowns helped local areas attract investments from 
their own affluent residents who made their fortune elsewhere. Some norms may increase 
transaction costs by circumventing laws and rules. In a society that tolerates substantial 
corruption, economic transaction costs will be high because businessmen have to bribe 
government officials or bureaucrats to get licenses. Enterprises can transfer the cost to 
customers, but this only transfers the cost of economic inefficiency within the society.  
        Informal institutions have been essential in affecting Chinese regional political 
economies. One example is the influence of equity, a norm that has dominant status in 
shaping Chinese people’s way of thinking and public policy-making. This norm 
influenced the operation and policy choice of the CCP and Chinese government (Huang, 
2001). The term equity in Chinese culture first means the equal process of social 
competition, a norm on which the traditional Chinese civil exams (Keju) were built to 
evaluate and promote individuals. Whoever passed the exam would become an official 
and receive social respect. Nevertheless, civil exams only assured a very limited extent of 
social equity because some citizens, especially women, were prohibited from taking the 
exam. Second, equity in traditional Chinese society mainly referred to the will of the 
Heaven, and the government and the emperor would lose legitimacy if they failed to meet 
this goal. In addition, a radical interpretation of equity, mainly advocated by 
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revolutionary peasants, stressed equal income of every social member. This utopian 
interpretation of equity had successfully helped peasant leaders mobilize the poor 
Chinese during the three major revolts occurred in 881, 990, and 1636 respectively (Bai, 
1991). Hence, most traditional Chinese governments would claim they had behaved 
accordingly to the rule of equity, which was also the will of the Heaven, to maintain or 
consolidate their legitimacy.         
        The CCP inherited and institutionalized this norm of equity. It affected economic 
policy-making in post-1949 China as it was an informal institution and one fundamental 
source for making related economic policies (Wei, 2000). This institution in modern 
China mainly requires that economically no one should be far better than others, which 
vitally motivated the central government and the CCP during the pre-1979 period to 
design policies to reduce regional inequality when the Coastal area was believed as far 
more developed than other regions.  
        Collectivism is another institutionalized Chinese norm that affects modern Chinese 
society. The norm maintains that individual interests could only be retained after 
collective interests were defended and enhanced. Collectivism affected economic policy-
making in communist China by limiting policy options that decision-makers could 
choose, and it also helped decide the substance of related policies. For example, the 
Chinese government did not believe that local autonomy could produce a powerful 
China. Instead, it posited that the more power the central government had, the more likely 
for China to develop. When making policies to develop China, the CCP thus preferred to 
concentrate all power in the national government. Collectivism partially explains the 
reason that the CCP after 1949 insisted that regional economies serve the interests of 
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national economy. This norm was incorporated into the Chinese political institutions and 
allowed the central government to ask individual local regions, if possible, to sacrifice for 
national interests. During Mao’s leadership, the Chinese government designed policies to 
support the rapid development of the Inland and West although Coastal economic 
efficiency was suppressed (Yang, 2001). After 1979, the Chinese central government and 
the CCP also designed policies to urge the Inland and West to sell raw materials and 
electric power to the Coastal area at low prices despite great discontent from the two 
regions (Dong, 1999). 
 
                                                               Conclusions 
        This chapter discusses political institutions, such as the CCP, dualism, and laws that 
were important for shaping Chinese economic development in post-1949 China. The 
chapter explores the way the power balance between the Chinese central and local 
government affected the implementation of policies that intended to change the Chinese 
regional inequality. This chapter also analyzes the CCP’s role in the shift of regional 
inequality through making laws, government rules, and policies. 
        The CCP significantly determined Chinese economic development through 
designing economic policies and providing resources to implement these policies.  
Dualism affected the actual effectiveness of policies designed by the Chinese central 
government or the CCP. Even powerful leaders such as Mao, often found it hard to 
change dualism in the post-1949 period. Finally, institutionalized norms, such as equity 
and collectivism, were important in affecting the reduction of regional inequality in post-
1949 China. 
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Chapter Five   Changing Political Institutions and Chinese Regional Inequality during 
Mao’s Leadership 
 
        This chapter explores the way the changes in Chinese political institutions 
contributed to the reduction of Chinese regional inequality during Mao’s leadership 
(1949 to 1979). This chapter illustrates the shifts of political parties, relations between the 
communist party and the state, the changing dualism between the central and local 
governments, and institutionalized ideologies for economic policy-making in post-1949 
China. The chapter finds that although senior leaders such as Mao exercised some 
political power, they were constrained by Chinese political institutions. The chapter then 
studies the way Chinese political institutions reduced Chinese regional inequality during 
the pre-1979 period.  The chapter shows that specific institutions and strategies, including 
the Five Year Plans (FYPs), the 156 Project, and the Third Front Project (TFP) furthered 
both institutional interests and regional equalization. The main finding is that Chinese 
political institutions and institutional shifts are necessary and sufficient for explaining 
Chinese regional inequality during Mao’s era. 
 
                 Institutional Approach and Chinese Regional Inequality (1949-1979) 
        As Chapter Three argues, in addition to institutional analysis, there are at least three 
alternative explanations for Chinese regional inequality. However, as I have discussed so 
far, they are incomplete in explaining the reduction of Chinese regional inequality during 
Mao’s leadership. 
        Economic theories focus on the difference of regional resource endowments and 
posit that it is the main source of regional inequality. As for the case of China, economic 
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models cannot fully explain the shifts of regional inequality after 1949. The difference of 
regional resource endowments partially affected Chinese regional inequality, but it is still 
insufficient in determining the frequent changes in regional inequality in post-1949 China 
when regional endowment difference is held constant.  
        International relations theories also cannot explain the shifts of regional inequality in 
post-1949 China. The main problem of these theories is that since China had changing 
international surroundings long before 1949, why did regional inequality only begin to 
change after 1949?  
        Moreover, cultural studies can partly explain some historical changes in Chinese 
regional inequality, but again they cannot explain post-1949 changes in regional 
inequality while culture was relatively stable across Chinese regions after 1949.  
        None of the three explanations can fully account for mechanisms that affected shifts 
of Chinese regional inequality between 1949 and 1979. Institutional Theory (IT), 
however, can fill this gap. First, IT comprehensively explains reasons and elements that 
drove changes in Chinese regional inequality after 1949. Political party dominance, 
dualism that defined the power balance between the central and local governments, and 
specific rules and plans such as the 156 Project and FYPs, constituted institutional factors 
that directly or indirectly affected changes in Chinese regional inequality.  Second, IT 
successfully explains the mechanism that shaped patterns of Chinese regional inequality; 
that is, the change in political parties and power structures between the central and local 
government affected the making of policies and rules that brought about Chinese regional 
inequality. This is evident by the comparison of the KMT and CCP’s governance in this 
chapter. Most important, the KMT national government had limited power to effectively 
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implement redistributive policy from the center, but the CCP had stronger centralized 
power to do so. In sum, IT rejects explanations that Chinese regional inequality was 
mainly determined by differences in regional cultures or resources, unexpected events 
such as the Cultural Revolution, or changes in international relations. 
 
                         The CCP: A New Powerful Political Party in post-1949 China  
         The CCP was almost an omnipotent institution that dominated the making and 
implementation of policies designed to reduce regional inequality during Mao’s 
leadership. The CCP, unlike the nationalist party KMT, was much more powerful and 
effective in shaping the path of regional development in China.  
         The Chinese political system before 1949 was characterized by a weak central 
government and governing party.  The KMT never effectively controlled China. First, the 
warlords who controlled local areas only nominally acknowledged the legitimacy and 
authority of the KMT central government. Second, the KMT government could not 
effectively resist aggression from Japan or other countries, and it had to acknowledge 
local authorities in exchange of their financial support (Wang, 1995).  
         The pre-1949 political system permitted or even slightly encouraged economic 
regional inequality to grow. Before 1949 the Coastal area developed faster due to its 
specialty in international trade. The Inland and West based their economic development 
on exporting natural resources, such as coal and iron ore, to the Coastal area.  Compared 
to the Coastal area, the Inland and West were relatively underdeveloped, and the central 
government could not effectively reduce Chinese regional inequality. There was no 
integrated national market in pre-1949 China, although the KMT central government had 
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tried to build one. The pre-1937 civil wars and the Sino-Japanese War (1937 to 1945) 
were mainly engaged in the Coastal and some Inland areas and they slowed the formation 
of a national market (Wang, 1995). 
        During Mao’s leadership (1949 to 1979), however, the CCP made every effort to 
exert control over policy-making and regional growth. The Chinese political institution 
statism (Guojia Zhuyi) helped the centralization of power in Chinese politics. Statism 
stressed that a strong centralized government is essential to build a strong China. Chinese 
history seemed to prove that China was powerful only when it was united under a 
centralized government. China would often draw attacks from northern tribes or descend 
into internal chaos when it had no powerful central government. Therefore, many 
Chinese supported a strong central government in principle. 
        The CCP incorporated statism into its policy-making during the pre-1979 period, 
which suggested centralized economy can effectively modernize a backward country 
(Naughton, 2004: 59-62). The CCP stipulated in 1956 that the CCP and the central 
government were the dominant authority to guide China’s development (Yang and Chen, 
2006:191-205). The central government retained the power to appoint and remove 
government leaders at every local level. Unlike those in the KMT government, local 
leaders during the post-1949 period would lose their jobs if they disobeyed central 
government orders. This control oversaw that central policies could be effectively 
implemented at local levels. 
        Statism also helped the CCP effectively control local economy through State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). In the early 1950s, the CCP denied private property rights and 
transformed all private companies into collective enterprises or SOEs (Pang, 1984). The 
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CCP centralized the fiscal system by stipulating that major local revenues would be 
allocated by the central government (Tong Shou Tong Zhi). The Chinese national bank, 
the Central People’s Bank (CPB), also helped the Chinese government or the CCP 
allocate funds effectively. The CCP ordered the CPB to set financial branches in most 
Chinese areas, and implement monetary policies to further regional growth of the West 
and Inland. Therefore, the CPB existed as a governmental agency to fulfill Chinese 
regional development policy during Mao’s era. 
        The CCP also tightly controlled the media to propagate the party’s policies and 
preferences (Chiu and Leng, 1984). The CCP instructed individuals from their childhood 
that all the Chinese obey the CCP’s rule to modernize China. The CCP also prohibited 
the formation of any independent organizations. Any social organizations were 
incorporated as subsidiaries of the CCP. The CCP also controlled people’s political 
participation by setting party units in every working unit (Danwei). Urban citizens were 
controlled by their working units, the schools, or residential committees. In the 1950s, the 
CCP also established millions of Shengchandui (working team) or Gongshe (agricultural 
community) in rural areas to control peasants and manage agricultural production (Li, 
2003; Perkins, 1975).  
        By the mid-1950s, the CCP had successfully institutionalized the ideology that 
ranked collectivism above individual interests, and stressed that individuals should serve 
collective interests. But the CCP during Mao’s leadership never eliminated all local 
resistance to central communist rule. The Chinese dualism, as mentioned in Chapter 
Four, provided a venue for local governments and officials to bargain with the central 
government to defend or enhance local interests. The central government periodically had 
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to decentralize its power when its policies failed and aroused discontents. The more 
difficulties the central government met, the more likely it would assign power to local 
governments (Dittmer, 1992). After the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1960) 
caused the starvation of millions of people, for example, the central government had to 
temporarily decentralize economic policy-making to steer the recovery from economic 
depression (Xiong, 2003; Gao, 2004; Li, 2006:172-176).          
 
                              Mao’s Limited Role in Chinese Economic Policy-Making  
         It is possible that some individuals tried to affect the trajectory of Chinese 
development. In contrast to what previous literature had asserted, detailed study shows 
that during Mao’s leadership, powerful leaders did not significantly control economic 
policy-making. Institutions such as the Chinese National Planning Committee (Guojia 
Jiwei) and the power balance among top leaders constrained individual leader’s ability to 
affect economic development during Mao’s leadership. In addition, Mao’s apathy to 
economic affairs after 1961 also constrained his influence on economic policy-making. 
        Unlike Jiang Kai-shek, Mao built high prestige in post-1949 China. Between 1927 
and 1949, Mao led a series of important wars to defeat the Japanese and the KMT armies, 
which won him great authority in the CCP and the government in post-1949 China.   
        Mao and many other top leaders were deeply influenced by the traditional Chinese 
norm Shi that stressed elites had the obligation and capacity to help the “ignorant” 
masses. This norm helped to consolidate the patriarchal rule which defined masters’ 
patronage and subordinates’ loyalty (Shih, 1995: 2-7).   
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        Mao thought that the humiliating history of China after the Opium War (1839 to 
1842) was caused by weak leadership, which Mao defined as “a group of selfish or 
unskilled top leaders” (Mao, 1945).  Mao argued that Western countries had bullied and 
exploited China through those weak Chinese leaders. To help China restore its glory and 
enable the country to develop quickly, China must have a powerful leadership.   
        Mao stressed that political power must be highly concentrated in the hands of senior 
party leaders. Mao ordered that his will should be fully implemented, but Mao often had 
to revise or even abandon his plans due to institutional constraints, including effective 
resistance from other party veterans or government agencies (Yang, 2001; Liu, 2008).  
        Mao tried to totally control the power by building personal allegiances from top 
military leaders because Mao thought that “political power is out of gun barrel”, meaning 
that military power is the basis of political governance (Mao, 1930). Mao built good 
relations with some powerful Marshals, such as Lin Biao (before 1971), Chen Yi, and Ye 
Jianyin, who enjoyed high prestige and had entrenched personal networks in the army. To 
construct an effective institution that prevented the concentration of military power in the 
hands of a small number of leaders, the CCP divided China into eleven Military Regions 
(MRs) and then reduced them into seven.20
                                                 
20 The number of regions changed to seven and then to eight in the 1970s. In 1983, the CCP redefined the 
number to seven.  
  Mao occasionally tried to change leaders in 
each MR, expecting to concentrate the military power by his own hands. However, these 
plans often failed because of opposition from senior Marshals. Another example was that 
five Marshals in 1971 successfully pressured Mao to change policies that might threaten 
the interests of these party veterans (Gao, 2004).  
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         Mao’s power also was balanced by other institutions. The Central Politburo, which 
was constituted by senior party leaders, could veto Mao’s policy. In a 1961 meeting 
attended by seven thousand cadres, due to pressures from the Central Politburo, Mao had 
to acknowledge his miscalculation in the making of economic policies that led to 
economic loss and famine between 1958 and 1961 (Gong, 1992). Mao’s meddling in 
economic policy-making decreased after that meeting because Mao also thought he was 
not adept at economic management and any errors in making economic policies would 
only provide opportunities for his rivals to attack him. In addition, the cumbersome 
process of making policies such as the Five Year Plans also discouraged Mao from 
influencing economic policy-making. 
        In sum, although Mao had great prestige in post-1949 China, institutions such as 
laws and rules, as well as power balance among senior leaders, greatly limited Mao’s 
personal influence on Chinese economic development. 
 
                              Institutionalized Ideologies during Mao’s Leadership 
        Institutionalized ideologies also affected making policies that reduced Chinese 
regional inequality during Mao’s leadership. First, the CCP institutionalized the 
“Communist Man” ideology, which assumed, although unrealistically, that every citizen 
was altruistic and sought to serve the interests of the society or the CCP. The CCP 
incorporated this idea into most policy-making and stipulated that all governmental 
agencies and individuals act for collective interests (Gao, 2004; Yang, 2001). According 
to this institutionalized ideology, each region must firmly obey central orders even if 
regional interests would be undermined. Thus, the ideology urges regional or local 
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governments to loyally implement economic policies designed by the CCP and the 
central government.  
        Second, the institutionalized Chinese norm equity also limited choices of the CCP 
and the Chinese government. Partly influenced by Chinese populism which highlighted 
the absolute equity across all social strata, the CCP defined equity as social justice and 
was an inalienable part of socialism or communism. The equity also indicated that in a 
system no individual part could be stronger than any others (Gong, 1992). 
        The institutionalized norm equity motivated the CCP and the central government to 
design specific policies to equalize Chinese regional development during the pre-1979 
period (Gong, 1992; Pang, 1984). The CCP stipulated that no region should be more 
developed than the others. The CCP knew that natural endowments were important in 
pushing regional development, but it also posited that if the CCP allowed each region to 
develop by itself, the Chinese economic system sooner or later would be in chaos. The 
CCP argued that regional inequality would destroy “economic balance” on which the 
Chinese economic system was based (Mao, 1956; Bo, 1998).  Hence, to attain a balanced 
development, the central government should strengthen weak areas and slow the growth 
of the more developed region via economic or political intervention. These ideas helped 
the CCP design policies such as the 156 Project and the Third Front Program to reduce 
regional inequality despite regional differences in natural endowments (Yang, 2001). 
 
      Institutions and Policies that Moved Regional Inequality during Mao’s Leadership 
        During Mao’s leadership, the CCP designed economic policies through specific 
agencies such as the National Planning Committee (NPC) and related departments in 
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charge of the issuing, publicizing, and implementation of these policies. Such an 
economic institution is termed as “command economy” which basically defined the 
dominant role of the CCP and the Chinese central government to adjust economy via 
orders, laws and rules, SOEs, and tightly controlled party systems (Naughton, 2004:59-
62). The following sections detail institutions of the command economy that affected 
dualism and reduced regional inequality during the pre-1979 period.  
 
Three Mechanisms that Drove Regional Inequality in China 
        There were three policy initiatives that indirectly affected China’s regional 
inequality. The first one was the Hukou or Residential Record System (RSS) policy, 
which terminated free labor mobility. In 1955, three years after the land reform, the CCP 
issued laws to prohibit free labor mobility across rural and urban areas because the CCP 
thought such mobility would erode the party’s political control (Chi and Wang, 2005).  In 
1956, labor mobility across regions was also limited by the RSS. Those who violated the 
rule would be labeled as “aimless migrants” (Mangliu) and soon found themselves 
policed by local government (Ding, 1995).21
        Second, the CCP and the government also strictly limited interregional trade during 
the pre-1979 period. The CCP and the government espoused separate regional markets 
although they had aimed to build a strong integrated national market. Based on the idea 
that regional interests should be subject to national interests, the CCP required each 
  The RRS limited the free flow of migrants 
and it endowed the government power to allocate human resources across regions.   
                                                 
21  In fact, during the reform era, the number of Mangliu has largely increased and they had to accept low 
wages and endure bullies from policeman or bureaucrats. 
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region follow the laws or orders issued from the central authority and all mobility of 
resources and goods across regions must be regulated by central governmental agencies. 
Most economic transactions were conducted through one particular institution that the 
government called Tong Gou Tong Xiao (collective purchasing and selling). Citizens had 
to get special tickets (Piao Zheng), most of which were issued by local governments, to 
buy necessities. Citizens traveled to other regions could not buy anything because Piao 
Zheng was designed only for local use (Pang, 1984). These regulations helped local 
enterprises sell their goods, often with inferior quality or high prices, to local residents.  
        Third, central governmental agencies such as the Central People’s Bank (CPB) and 
the NPC also tightly controlled capital mobility across regions. The CPB decided the 
amount of investment to each area and the NPC had the authority to ratify development 
projects reported from local areas (Pang, 1984). This institutional arrangement indicated 
that capital could mainly be allocated for political instead of economic reasons. 
        The control over capital mobility limited Coastal development, but helped the other 
two regions receive needed capital for local development because the control allowed 
them to amass capital, which previously would have flowed to the Coastal area to pursue 
higher rates of return (Dong, 2005b). Investment to the Coastal area hence slowed 
because the area could not attract funds from the other two regions any longer after 1949, 
and also because the Coastal area received less investment from the central government.  
 
The Centralization and Socialization of the Chinese economy    
        The ultimate goal of the CCP was to establish communism by centralizing and 
socializing economic resources. The CCP believed that China’s poverty was caused by 
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the uncontrolled economy during KMT’s governance. Almost all private enterprises, 
especially those supported by the KMT government, were described as the lackey of 
imperialism and only enriched themselves at the expense of Chinese national interests. 
The CCP thus claimed all private properties, such as land, capital, and natural resources, 
should be socialized.  
        Between 1949 and 1952, the CCP had successfully completed land reform by having 
confiscated all private-owned land and reallocated seven hundred million mu (each mu  
equals to 667 square meters) of land in equal parcels to three hundred million peasants 
regardless of the peasant’s agricultural productivity (Li, 2003).22
        Another important socialization policy implemented in the early 1950s was to 
transform private industries into SOEs. The CCP and the government set heavy taxes for, 
or constricted loans to, private enterprises. The CCP and the government also limited the 
legitimate scopes of private enterprises’ activities. For example, in 1951, the government 
directed that no private companies were allowed to participate in the production and 
distribution of food, cotton, salt, and chemical products, claming these products were 
crucial to people’s daily lives (Pang, 1984; Xiong, 2005; Yang, 2001). 
  The successful land 
reform not only laid an economic foundation for the CCP to continue its socialization, it 
also inspired the CCP to transform China’s other economic structures by political means. 
One example was the plan to reduce Chinese regional economic inequality (Pang, 1984).  
        The CCP also sued many private-enterprise owners between 1950 and 1953 for 
crimes including: tax evasion, selling inferior goods, profiteering, manipulating market 
                                                 
22 The rural communes were finally established in 1958, but the public property rights of land were built in 
1952 (Pang, 1984). 
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prices, bribing government officials or party members, and amassing food in the famine 
between 1950 and 1952 (Yang, 2001). Some private businesses were confiscated by the 
government, while others were “donated” to the government by their owners (Pang, 
1984; Yang, 2001).  
        The CCP and the Chinese central government affected the Chinese economy 
through SOEs. Before the mid 1990s, SOEs, though many of them were inefficient, 
dominated the Chinese economy. SOEs affected dualism and helped the central 
government gain economic power relative to the local government. SOEs enabled the 
CCP and the central government to strategically arrange the production, distribution, and 
even consumption of products. For example, before the early 1980s almost all heavy 
industries were SOEs and were controlled by the central government. The state also 
required SOEs to hire more workers than needed to help the CCP secure city residents’ 
“rights to work”, although the requirement had reduced economic efficiency of SOEs 
(Sun, 1991; Chen, 1998).23
         By the mid 1950s, the Chinese government had completed its effort to socialize 
Chinese rural and urban economies. In 1953 the CCP ordered all remaining private land 
in the rural area to be transformed into collectively-owned property before 1956. The 
rearrangement of property rights might be economically inefficient, but it established the 
basis of socialist economy as the CCP had expected. The socialization of urban economy 
was attained in 1956 and no private enterprises remained in China. Most private owners 
were hired by the government as managers or economic consultants. 
   
                                                 
23 Szelenyi et al also argues that the low efficiency of SOEs in Eastern European countries was due to the 
soft budget constraint and other mismanagement (Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1994). 
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        The CCP found it effective to change China’s economy by issuing political orders. 
The free market was almost abandoned in China during Mao’s leadership (Sachs and 
Yang, 2002; Naughton, 2004: 59-62). Almost all prices were set by the NPC or other 
governmental agencies. For example, the NPC set the prices of soaps, bicycles, film 
tickets, hair-cutting, and other services. Beginning in 1953, the NPC also governed the 
monopolistic purchasing and selling of important resources such food, cotton, and coal, 
etc. (Xiong, 2005).  According to a study, during the pre-1979 era, about sixty percent of 
all industrial goods and seventy percent of agricultural goods were directly priced by the 
NPC. Other governmental agencies, including the Textile Department and the Coal 
Department, also controlled the pricing of other commodities (Liu, 2008). Thus, when the 
CCP found it necessary to support interior development, it used a “price transfer” policy 
by ordering Coastal products sold at low prices, while increasing the prices of the two 
regions’ commodities.  
        Economic centralization after 1949 also meant that the CCP and the central 
government mobilized enough technological and managerial resources to facilitate 
economic development in the Inland and West.  The establishment of SOEs in the West 
and Inland vitally facilitated industrialization in the two areas and reduced Chinese 
regional economic inequality. Enterprises that previously could not be set in the Inland or 
the West due to the lack of profitability, funds, or economic endowments could be built 
in or relocated to these two areas after 1949 by state intervention. Table 5.1 shows that in 
post-1949 China, especially during the period 1965 to 1971, the Chinese central 
government invested the major proportion of investment in the Western and Inland SOEs. 
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Without the central funding, industrialization of the two areas could not advanced so 
quickly 
  
  Table 5.1   Capital Construction Investment in SOEs by major periods (Percent) 
Regions 1953-64 1965-71 1972-77 
Coastal 40.1 27.9 40.7 
Inland 32.5 31 31.6 
West 27.4 41.1 27.7 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Wei. 2000: 80-81.  
 
The FYPs and the Reduction of Regional Inequality    
        The Chinese government knew that it could not industrialize China and reduce 
regional inequality in a short time. So beginning in the early 1950s the CCP and the 
government initiated the Five Year Plans (See Table 5.2) to gradually build heavy 
industries and realize socialist economy in China via central planning (Dong, 2005 a).  
         All the FYPs during Mao’s leadership provided an institutional context for reducing 
regional inequality. The FYPs were mainly designed by the NPC to modernize China and 
reduce regional inequality at a steady pace over years. The CCP began to implement the 
first FYP in 1953 when the Korean War was over (Xu, 2005).   
        The CCP’s eagerness to build a modern agricultural sector in China, especially in 
the West and Inland, was also reflected in the early FYPs.  Many factories, schools, or 
irrigation projects were built in the Inland and Western region to support agricultural 
development in the two regions.  
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    Table 5.2  The Five Year Plans and Their Impact on Chinese Regional Inequality 
The Five Year Plans Dates Main Projects Related with 
Regional Development 
Results  
First Five Year Plan 1953-1957 The 156 Project The 156 Project pushed the 
rapid industrialization of the 
two areas and reduced 
Chinese regional inequality. 
Second Five Year Plan 1958-1962 The Great Leap Forward 
(GLF) 
Between 1963 and 1965 the 
FYP was suspended due to 
the disaster caused by the 
GLF 
Third Five Year Plan 1966-1970 The Cultural Revolution; 
The Third Front Program 
(TFP) 
Local regions won more 
power in dealing with local 
economy. The TFP greatly 
developed the economy of 
the West and Inland area. 
Chinese regional inequality 
reduced. 
Fourth Five Year Plan 1971-1975 TFP The TFP greatly developed 
the West and Inland. 
Chinese regional inequality 
was reduced. 
Fifth Five Year Plan 1976-1980 Radicalism ended and 
economic reform began in 
1979; Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) was built to 
develop the Coastal area  
The Coastal area’s economy 
began to take-off.  
Sixth Five Year Plan 1981-1985 The Expansion of SEZs The Coastal area developed 
rapidly and regional 
inequality enlarged. 
Seventh Five Year Plan 1986-1990 The Expansion of SEZs; 
Local governments got more 
leeway to tackle local 
economic development 
Chinese regional inequality 
enlarged. 
Eighth Five Year Plan 1991-1995 The Expansion of SEZs Chinese regional inequality 
enlarged. Secessionist 
leaders in Xinjiang and 
Tibet mobilized supporters. 
Ninth Five Year Plan 1996-2000 The “Develop the West” 
Strategy was launched in 
1998. 
Many SOEs in the West and 
Inland went bankrupt. 
Chinese regional inequality 
further enlarged. 
Tenth Five Year Plan 2001-2005 More powers were given to 
local governments 
Chinese regional inequality 
kept on enlarging. 




       The Chinese central government also tried to improve labor productivity in the other 
two regions by investing in civilian key-point development projects, including schools 
and health facilities. Table 5.3 shows the tilted investment toward civilian development 
projects in the Inland and West in the first FYP. As the population in each of the two 
regions was less than that of the Coastal area, such investment at per capita level was 
more tilted toward the two regions. The CCP and the Chinese government retained such 
investment structure till the late 1970s. 
 
Table 5.3   Investment in Civilian Key-point Development Projects in the First FYP 
(1953-57) (million yuan) 
 
 No of projects Amount (Million Yuan) Percent 
Total  98 14261 100.0 
Coastal  26 4449 31.2 
Inland  56 7902 55.4 
Western 16 1911 13.4 
                 Source: Wei, 2000:75.  
   
      To maintain economic or regional equilibrium, the FYPs during Mao’s leadership 
aimed to reduce regional inequality incrementally because it was unrealistic to complete 
grand projects within one five-year schedule. One example was the construction of 
railways in the Inland and West, including the Chengkun and Qiangui Railway in the 
mountainous Southwest and the Lanxin Rail Line in the Northwest. Both projects took 
more than ten years to finish due to financial and technological constraints (Dong, 1999).  
        In sum, if the CCP’s grand policy of developing China and reducing regional 
inequality was a comprehensive blueprint, then the FYPs during Mao’s leadership 
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provided institutional templates for realizing the blueprint gradually. The FYPs also 
strengthened the power of the central government because the CCP could use the plans to 
concentrate economic and political resources to realize China’s development goals. 
 
                                              The 156 Project and Third Front Project 
        In each FYP before the late 1970s, specific policies were designed to reduce a 
regional inequality. The CCP tried to use several means to attain the goal during Mao’s 
leadership. The first tool was the State Investment Plan, through which the central bank, 
the People’s Bank (Renmin Yinhang), invested directly in each region to affect regional 
development. According to Chinese Central Statistical Bureau, between 1952 and 1979, 
the two regions received about sixty percent of all the direct investment from the central 
government. Since there was no private or limited foreign investment after 1952 when the 
CCP had almost eliminated private property rights, direct investment from the Chinese 
government reflected the real investment that each region could get during Mao’s era. 
This statistic thus showed the CCP’s determination to accelerate development in the less 
developed regions (Gao, 2003; Pang, 1984; Bo, 1998).  
        Another tool that the central government used to balance regional inequality was 
direct government spending to the two regions, which facilitated the two regions’ 
economic development. Table 5.4 shows some important expenditures in the 1950s were 
paid by the Chinese central government. The structure retained until the late 1970s, 
which enabled the central government economic power to reduce Chinese regional 
inequality. For example, the major expenses related with building economic 
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infrastructures, reflected by the variable economic construction in the table, in the West 
and Inland were paid by the central government. 
 
Table 5.4   The Percentage of Expenditures Paid by the Central Government in the 
1950s (Percent) 
 1950-56 1955 1956 1957 
Economic construction 83.8 87.3 79.3 78.2 
Culture, education, and health 28.2 25.8 30.4 26.7 
National defense 100 100 100 100 
Administration 20.1 16.4 15.4 11.7 
Credits and loan repayments 100 100 100 100 
Other 76.7 n/a 30.3 34.2 
Source: Lardy, 1979:71-72.  
 
Table 5.5   Rate of Interregional Income Transfer in Selected Provinces,  
1953-1980 (percent) 
 
 1953-57 1958-62 1963-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 
Coastal -9.4 -15.6 -15.7 -20.2 -21.2 -20.5 
Inland -1.4 -1.6 -4.2 -6.2 -4.1 -2.9 
West 7.6 8.6 9.1 20.9 15.2 10.8 
Source: Based on Wei, 2000: 66. 
 
        The CCP and the Chinese central government used national income transfer to 
suppress the Coastal development but encourage the Western growth. Table 5.5 shows 
that before 1980, the central government transferred income to the Western area through 
direct subsidies, preferential prices for goods and services, or direct appropriation. For 
example, the Coastal area after mid-1960s had more than twenty percent of its income 
transferred out of this region, while the West had at least more than ten percent of income 
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transferred in. Since Beijing had the positive transfer from the central government, the 
actual wealth outflow from most Coastal areas was even larger. The central government 
also transferred wealth out of the Inland, but most of the money was invested back into 
the Inland area in the form of newly-built SOES.  
        Moreover, before 1979, the central government designed a higher tax rate for the 
Coastal area than for the other two areas. Such tax code was economically inefficient, 
because high tax suppressed further development of the productive Coastal area.  The tax 
policy, however, helped to finance the development projects of the two regions with 
revenues garnered from the Coastal area (Dong, 2005a and b). 
 
The 156 Project     
         The Chinese central government also reduced the regional gap by directly 
establishing industries in the Inland and West. The most famous program was the 156 
Project that established about 160 big factories in the two regions.  
        The 156 Project was initiated as a grand strategy to strengthen China’s war potential 
in the early 1950s with the help of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European 
countries. Beginning in 1950, after the Korean War broke out, the CCP asked the Soviet 
Union to transfer advanced technologies related to military applications. After several 
years of negotiation between China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union agreed to 
help China build about 160 factories while in return China would export agricultural 
products and raw materials to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the 
following decades. The Soviet Union and China expected these projects would modernize 
China quickly and increase the total power of the “socialist camp” (Dong, 2003).   
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        Due to the vulnerable strategic location of the Coastal area in potential wars, the 
CCP decided to set most factories in the Inland and West. According to an official report, 
the number of projects that the government could finally complete was 156.  Of all these 
factories, 124 were built in the Western and Inland area. Of the thirty two projects built in 
the Coastal area, twenty one were built in Liaoning, a northeastern province which 
already had a strong industrial base and was seen as China’s logistic base for the Korean 
War (Dong, 2003; Gao, 2003). 
        The 156 Project greatly reshaped the industrial geography of China. In most of the 
Inland and Western provinces, these factories were the first modern heavy industries ever 
constructed (Dong, 2005 a; Chen, 2006).  To secure effective operation of these projects, 
China also built schools, hospitals, roads, and other related facilities in the Inland and 
West which advanced the two areas’ economic growth.  
        These projects indeed motivated the two regions’ industrialization by successfully 
transferring modern technologies, managerial skills, and skilled workers to the two 
regions (Dong, 2005a). Although most of these factories were expected to produce 
military products, they also produced goods for civilian use. Automobile and air force 
factories, for example, in the two Inland provinces Hubei and Jiangxi also produced 
tractors, buses, and electric fans.24
                                                 
24 In fact, these factories were established by experts, workers, and the masses with more political fervor 
than economic motivation. Since the 1950s, economic motivation was perceived by the CCP as an effective 
way to realize capitalists’ property rights. Thus, political motivation became main tool to mobilize the 
masses for economic development. 
  Chemical plants built in two Western provinces 
Gansu and Shaanxi had continuously provided local peasants fertilizers and pesticides 
ever since (Bo, 1998). 
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         Another contribution of these factories to the two regions was they directly 
employed more than one million local residents. For several decades of operation, these 
factories had helped the two regions train skilled workers, which was essential for further 
industrial growth. These factories also generated about half of total revenues in the two 
regions and fostered the development of related enterprises such as transportation, raw 
material cultivation, and necessary facilities with technical and managerial assistance. 
More important, these factories diversified and modernized Chinese economic structure, 
and the two regions’ economic growths did not rely solely on agriculture after industrial 
bases were successfully built in these regions (Dong, 1999; Dong, 2003). 
 
The Third Front Program and the Changing Regional Inequality 
        Besides the 156 Project in the 1950s, the Chinese government also staged another 
grand project that profoundly affected Chinese regional inequality in the 1960s. This was 
The Third Front Program. Mainly initiated to enhance China’s military potential, this 
project eventually pushed economic development of the Inland and West and reduced the 
economic gap across the three Chinese regions.  
        The CCP designed the “Self-Reliance” strategy, stipulating that each region should 
develop a strong, self-sufficient, and independent economic system to survive a long war 
with other countries. The “Self-Reliance” strategy was first proposed by the CCP in 1938 
as the CCP strategy for managing the war against the Japanese. In the 1950s, the CCP 
interpreted the strategy as “to develop China on its own resources” (Pang, 1984). In the 
late 1950s, the CCP began to believe that each Chinese region should have power to 
sustain a long-term war with other countries (Mao, 1938; 1956; 1964; Pang, 1984, Dong, 
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1999). In the 1960s, the CCP increasingly perceived an incoming war with the Soviet 
Union or the US when relations with the two countries were in trouble. To strengthen 
China’s military resilience, the CCP began to transform the Inland and West into war 
bases as soon as possible and gradually reduce Chinese regional economic inequality 
(Mao, 1964; Pang, 1984; Bo 1998). 
        On August 30th 1964, the CCP initiated the “The Third Front” project to ready 
China’s economy for the expected war. This policy defined the Coastal area as the First 
Front that could be easily destroyed by the war, which had been demonstrated by the 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The policy designated cities in the other two areas 
(excluding those border provinces) as the Second Front and mountainous and rural areas 
in the Inland and West as the Third Front.25
                                                 
25 In the Sino-Japanese War, China lost almost all of the Coastal area to Japan in about one year. In 
addition, about ninety percent of all heavy industries were destroyed by the Japanese in the first year of the 
war. The CCP leaders in the 1960s thus believed it was unwise to invest heavily in the Coastal area. 
  The policy stipulated that future investment 
would be mainly focused on the Second and Third Front, and important Coastal factories, 
schools, and government agencies should be relocated to the other two regions to avoid 
the war shock. The policy stipulated that Third Front factories and related facilities 
should be built in the “mountainous, remote, and cavernous” (Shan, San, Dong) areas. 
Although this policy also allowed the Coastal area to retain and even develop some light 
industries, the main investment orientation had changed toward the West and Inland.  
Between 1965 and 1979, the Inland and West received more than sixty percent of all 
direct investment from the Chinese central government (Chen, 2006; Chu, 2003). 
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        The Third Front program lasted for sixteen years (1964-1980). The Chinese 
government had invested more than 205 billion yuan to the project during that period. 
About eleven hundred conglomerated enterprises, many of them heavy industries, such as 
machinery manufacturing, iron and steel factories, and chemical plants, were built in the 
Inland and Western area (Chen, 2003).     
        Although some of the Third Front Enterprises (TFEs) were economically inefficient, 
they greatly facilitated economic development of the Western and Inland area. The Third 
Front Program consolidated the industrial base in the two areas built during previous 
years, and it also significantly developed transportation facilities for the two poor areas. 
More than sixty percent of newly built Chinese railways and about fifty-five percent of 
newly built Chinese highways were placed in the Inland and West (Chu, 2003).  At least 
1.5 million Coastal skilled workers were assigned into these TFEs.  Schools and research 
institutions were also built to serve TFEs. The government thus increased human capital 
in the two areas (Chen, 2003).26
 
  Moreover, the Third Front program developed medical 
services in the Inland and West, which increased the two areas’ productivity by supplying 
healthy workers for the two areas’ modernization (Wu and Dong, 2001).  
                          Regional Development Policies during Political Upheavals 
        Even during periods of political disruption during Mao’s leadership, political 
institutions consistently reduced the regional gap. The two most disruptive periods were 
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During 
                                                 
26 These schools and institutions were managed by TFEs. The moving of these TFEs out of the remote and 
mountainous area in the 1990s cost Chinese central government dearly. 
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these periods, normal operations of government agencies were frequently disrupted by 
struggles among top leaders, but policies to reduce regional inequality continued. In other 
words, despite widespread political upheaval, the Five Year Plans and other institutions 
guaranteed effective implementation of policies designed to reduce regional inequality. 
 
The Great Leap Forward Movement and the Uneven Regional Development    
        The Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement started in 1958, the year the second FYP 
began. Enchanted by the first FYP’s success in establishing an industrial basis and 
brining quick recovery from the war destruction, the CCP thought that China could do 
better in the second FYP and China’s economy would “exceed that of the UK in fifteen 
years and that of the US in fifty years” (Pang, 1984). The economic growth of China 
would be used to show that socialism was superior to capitalism (Teiwes and Sun, 1999).  
 
Table 5.6 Regional Shares of Chinese Government Investment, 1953--1975 (Percent) 
Year 1953-56 1958 1969 1975 
Coastal 45.9 39.2 36.2 39.5 
Inland and West 54.1 60.8 63.8 60.5 
         Source: CNSB, 1987. 
 
        To equalize the development rate across Chinese regions, the CCP invested more in 
the Inland and West. Table 5.6 shows the distribution of government investment before 
the mid-1970s. During the period 1953-1956, the Coastal area received about 45.9 
percent of all government investment. In 1958, however, the Coastal area received only 
39.2 percent, and in 1969 the figure decreased to 36.2 percent. Investment in exploring 
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oils in the Coastal region beginning in the late 1960s had only increased that figure 
slightly to 39.5 percent by the end of 1975 (CNSB, 1987). 
        Besides direct investment to the two areas, the central government also encouraged 
the Inland and Western areas to develop small enterprises that only needed limited 
technology and capital. However, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) plan set unrealistically 
high goals because the CCP overestimated the importance of human capital and 
underestimated the importance of physical capital and technology in economic 
development. For example, one slogan in the early 1958 claimed that “the higher the 
people’s ambitions, the higher the productivity of the land”, regardless of the actual 
productivity potential of the land (Ding, 1995; Gao, 2004). 
        The slogan soon guided China’s economic policies at all levels. Trying to cater to 
the central government, local governments often reported the inflated agricultural and 
industrial production to the central government that in turn facilitated the setting of 
unrealistic national goals for regional development.  
        First, Chinese peasants were forced to engage in local industrial production, 
especially in small steel furnaces (Xiao Gaolu), which diverted them from managing 
crops. Second, during the GLF, the Collective Purchasing (Tong Gou) policy required 
peasants to sell about fifteen percent to twenty five percent of their total agricultural 
products to the government. More important, the central government and the CCP 
evaluated local officials by using local agricultural production as measure of success. To 
get a good evaluation, local officials often over-reported production. Typically, they 
reported about five times the real agricultural production to the central government. 
Peasants thus had to sell the majority of products to the government and they had 
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insufficient food left for themselves (Song, 1998). Such policy accelerated the severity of 
the famine, which was initiated by a drought, in 1959 and 1960.  
        The destruction of agriculture due to the GLF not only temporarily constricted the 
quick development of the Inland and West, but also depressed the Coastal growth. The 
average growth rate of the Chinese economy between 1961 and 1963 was only 1.2 
percent while the rate before that period was about seven percent (Bo, 1998; Pang, 1984).  
        One unexpected outcome of the GLF was that small enterprises survived throughout 
China and helped to develop regional economies. The Five Smalls (Wuxiao), for 
example, had developed the Western and Inland economy and reduced Chinese regional 
inequality during Mao’s leadership (Chu, 2003; Yang, 2001). The Five Smalls referred to 
small iron and steel factories, mechanical plants, chemical factories, coal mines, and 
cement plants. Some of these small factories were initiated in 1953, but they did not win 
much support because then the central government focused on large-scale factories. It 
was the GLF that facilitated the development of such small enterprises in the West and 
Inland and transformed them into essential part of the two areas’ economic growth. 
 
The Reduced Regional Inequality during the Cultural Revolution     
        According to official propaganda of the CCP after 1979, the Cultural Revolution 
(1966—1976) was “Ten Years of Chaos”. According to this definition, civilian protests 
or revolts advocated by Mao greatly undermined the authority of the CCP. Military 
conflicts among various factions between 1966 and 1968, which caused half million 
deaths nationwide, had almost terminated governmental operation and the Chinese 
economy was mired in economic recession at the end of 1976 (Bo, 1998).  
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          These general facts exaggerate the negative influences of the Cultural Revolution, 
because these characterizations were used to enhance the legitimacy of new leaders after 
1979.  Indeed, the CCP still designed effective policies to develop the Inland and West 
economy between 1966 and 1976. To realize the CCP’s consistent goal of building a 
powerful China as soon as it could, some economic policies were designed and 
effectively implemented during the Cultural Revolution.  Advocated by Mao, the CCP in 
August 1966 called for the Chinese to “encourage revolution but also increase production 
(zhua geming, cushengchan),” and shirking would be severely punished because it was 
interpreted as to “destroy socialist production”. This policy indicated that economic 
growth was still an important goal for the communist party. Even during the most 
tumultuous years between 1967 and 1968, the CCP also managed to help large SOEs 
operate effectively although the rural economy underwent temporary recession. Soldiers 
often were sent to these SOEs to limit destruction from fighting factions.  
        In 1969, after two years’ stagnation, the Chinese economy began to grow. Indeed, 
the Chinese economy still developed during the Cultural Revolution, and the average 
annual growth rate between 1966 and 1976 was 6.8 percent (Chu, 2003; Meisner, 1996).  
        During the Cultural Revolution, besides the ongoing construction of the Third Front 
Programs in the Inland and West, the CCP also designed some policies, which were 
incorporated in FYPs, to facilitate economic development of the West and Inland. The 
first policy was designed in 1968 which required all youth with high school education to 
go to rural areas to accept the “Socialist Education”. The main goal of this policy was for 
the CCP to relocate about four million well-educated students from urban to rural areas 
(Liu, 1998).  This policy helped to relocate millions of “educated youths” (Zhiqing) to 
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rural areas in the Inland and West, greatly increasing the human capital for these areas. 
According to a report, in 1972 alone about four hundred thousand students from other 
areas were moved to Xinjiang, a poor and underdeveloped provincial area mainly 
occupied by ethnic minorities. 27
        Due to the influence of the institutionalized value of national “self-reliance”, China 
tried to develop its own sources of raw materials in the 1960s. Hundreds of resources 
searching teams were formed, and the Cultural Revolution did not interrupt their work. In 
1966, the Chinese Oil Department also sent about two hundred teams to the West to 
search oil or natural gas. The resulting growth of China’s oil industry was astounding. 
Between 1966 and 1979, major new oil fields were found in the Inland and West, and 
crude oil production increased with an average annual rate of 18.6 percent. In 1979, 
China’s oil production exceeded one hundred million tons, which helped China become 
the eighth largest oil producing country in the world. The development of oil industry in 
the Inland and West increased revenues to the two areas, and it also helped other related 
industries, such as mechanical industry, transportation, and chemical refining, develop in 
the two regions (Jiao, 1988). 
 At least one million middle school graduates were also 
relocated to poor areas such as Inter Mongolia, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Heilongjiang, 
Yunnan, and Guangxi, which increased average education level of labors and hence 
productivity in these areas (Liu, 1998).  
        To improve the irrigation system and increase electric power in China, the post-1949 
Chinese government built many reservoirs, especially in the Inland and West. Table 5.7 
                                                 
27 Besides to relocate skilled workers to Xinjiang, the CCP also believed this policy would help the ethnic 
majority Han to control the area firmly (Xinhua News Agency, 2000).  
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shows there were 444 large reservoirs built in China between 1949 and 1979. Of all these 
reservoirs, the Inland and West combined constituted about sixty two percent. 
Considering the central government also funded the building of many smaller reservoirs 
in the Inland and West, the irrigation capacity and electric power production in the two 
areas had been largely enhanced during the period 1949 to 1979. 
 
Table 5.7   Distributions of Newly-Built Large Reservoirs in China, 1949 to 1979 
 
Areas Numbers Percent 
Coastal 170 38.29 
Inland 181 40.76 
West 93 20.95 
Total 444 100 
                   Source: Yubendaodi, 2008. http://economy.guoxue.com/article.php/18700. 
 
        The CCP also developed small hydroelectric power plants in the West and Inland 
where there were abundant water resources. Before 1949, there was limited demand for 
electric power in the two areas, because local industries were very few and local residents 
could not afford to use electricity. Thus, only a few big cities in the two areas such as 
Luoyang, Xian, Lanzhou, and Chengdu, had small electric power plants funded by the 
KMT government (Chen et al, 2006: 170-92). With the development of the two regions 
after 1949, the need for electricity increased. Because the CCP perceived that the Coastal 
area was very vulnerable to attack, it did not think electric power conveyed from the 
Costal area would be reliable in wartime. Therefore, since China did not have enough 
funds to develop many large electric power plants in the Inland and West simultaneously, 
the CCP strongly encouraged developing small hydroelectric powers in the two areas. 
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During the Cultural Revolution, small hydroelectric plants boomed in the Inland and 
West as they not only solved regional needs, but they were also viewed as a test of local 
loyalty in implementing central policies.  By the end of 1974 these small hydroelectric 
plants had constituted about one third of all electricity that China produced in that year 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2000). 
        Hence, even during the Cultural Revolution, effective policies were designed and 
effectively implemented to reduce Chinese regional inequality. 
 
                  Conclusion: Reduced Regional Inequality during Mao’s Leadership 
        Political institutions during Mao’s leadership (1949 to 1979) had fundamentally 
reduced regional inequality in China. The CCP made policies to reduce regional 
economic inequality. The CCP and other agencies constrained individual leaders such as 
Mao in affecting economic policy-making. Affected by the institutionalized norm of 
equity, the CCP’s institutional interests, and the urgent need to industrialize China in a 
perceived dangerous international context, the Chinese central government had designed 
a series of policies, such as the 156 Project, to reduce regional inequality during Mao’s 
leadership. The FYPs built an institutional mechanism to assure the consistent 
implementation of such policies. Even during the periods of political upheavals, such as 
the Great Leap Forward (1958--1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966--1976), policies 
to develop the Inland and West were effectively implemented.  
        The policies aimed to reduce Chinese regional inequality during Mao’s leadership 
brought some positive results. First, the economic infrastructure was greatly upgraded.  
Before 1949, the Inland and West only had very few modern industries and local 
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residents were less educated than Coastal residents. The ruptured economic structure in 
pre-1949 China was not helpful for the establishment of a consolidated national market. 
Before 1949, the Inland and West could not enjoy the benefits from Chinese economic 
growth, and the Coastal area won almost all of the economic advances. The CCP’s 
policies, however, helped the West and Inland successfully build modern industries. The 
development of education in the two areas also provided large number of skilled workers 
for the two regions’ future modernization.  
         In addition to Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 that shows that regional inequality had been 
reduced during the pre-1979 period, Table 5.8 also shows that most Inland and Western 
provinces had increased per capita industrial output during that period, which helped to 
reduce regional inequality. Some underdeveloped interior provinces such as Gansu, 
Xinjiang, and Hubei built and developed heavy industries and increased per capita 
industrial output. The industrialization in Jilin and Helongjiang also intensified, although 
the per capita industrial output in the two provinces decreased due to the large inflow of 
migrants that were arranged by the CCP.  
        Second, the policies that reduced Chinese regional inequality also helped to integrate 
a Chinese national market that was crucial in driving China’s further modernization. The 
development of transportation facilities was aimed to improve the central control over 
remote areas, but fostered regional communication. Railroads and highways built during 
Mao’s era made it more convenient and economical than before for the two regions to 
convey natural resources to the Coastal area, helping the two areas amass precious capital 
for economic growth. For example, between 1973 and 1979, the Coastal area imported 
about seventy eight percent of needed coal from the Inland and West. The 
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industrialization of the two areas also increased local residents’ income, helping them 
affordable for more Coastal goods (Lu, 1990: 33).  
 
Table 5.8    Distribution of Per Capita Industrial Output by Province (Yuan) 
Province/Year 1952 1965 1974 1979 
Coastal Area     
Liaoning 385 334 300 257 
Beijing 481 385 617 513 
Tianjin 1112 572 663 498 
Hebei 55 86 122 84 
Shandong 62 58 77 87 
Jiangsu 84 93 113 138 
Shanghai 1517 1165 1404 1106 
Zhejiang 76 72 58 85 
Fujian 69 56 48 59 
Guangdong 84 94 85 79 
     
Inland Area     
Heilongjiang 222 195 127 141 
Jilin 161 148 109 120 
Shanxi 92 n/a 72 91 
Henan 30 41 43 50 
Anhui 36 40 36 51 
Hubei 74 64 58 86 
Jiangxi 54 n/a 49 51 
Hunan 40 41 44 63 
     
Western Area     
Xinjiang 82 86 46 54 
Gansu 51 87 100 92 
Shaanxi 56 73 64 80 
Qinghai 45 73 99 78 
Shichuan 55 53 41 54 
Guizhou 33 48 34 36 
Yunnan 48 38 32 40 
Tibet  7 13 14 11 
Ningxia 10 24 35 80 
Guangxi 33 32 37 57 
Inter Mongolia 60 251 187 63 
Source: Yang, 1997:22. 
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        Despite these achievements and the wide support from the two regions, the policies 
still engendered many social and environmental problems. First, these policies inhibited 
the development of the Coastal area. According to a report, between 1964 and 1971, 
about 380 large factories, 38,000 suites of machines, and 1.45 million skilled workers 
were relocated from the Coastal area to the West and Inland (Gao, 2004). The CCP’s 
unbalanced investment policy also put the Coastal area in disadvantage during Mao’s 
leadership as this area lacked enough capital to develop its economic potential (Wang, 
1986).  Table 5.8 also shows that the Coastal area endured slow industrial growth. 
Indeed, per capita industrial output in previously developed industrial bases, including 
decreased greatly during the period between 1952 and 1979. For example, per capita in 
Liaoning, Shanghai, and Tianjin during this period decreased 33.25%, 26.96%, and 
55.22% respectively. This change was caused by the institutional changes that motivated 
the Western and Inland growth but suppressed the Coastal development. These problems 
had elicited strong discontent in the Coastal area. Some economists also argued the 
“equity” had undermined the overall economic efficiency although the West and Inland 
developed (Dong, 2005 a; Gao, 2003).  
        Second, environmental problems generated by these policies were also severe. One 
example was the agricultural cultivation of Xinjiang, a Western province dominated by 
deserts. In 1949, the arable land in Xinjiang was about 13,005 square kilometers. Led by 
the government-sponsored paramilitary unit, the Xinjiang Productive and Cultivation 
Corp, migrants from other areas constructed new oases by conducting water from 
mountain snowmelt or underground aquifers. At the end of 1979, Xinjiang proudly 
announced it owned about 58,000 square kilometers of arable land to produce abundant 
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cotton, rice, and other crops. However, the extensive cultivation has severely undermined 
the eco-system in Xinjiang. Due to the over-extraction of underground water, about 
twenty five percent of land has been irreversibly alkalized. The snow-melt water flow 
from mountains also alkalized valleys along the Talimu River (Wang, 2004).   
        Another problem occurred in the Southwestern province of Yunnan in the late 
1960s. The local government filled many local lakes to increase arable land.  But most of 
these newly engineered lands could not produce crops because of high concentration of 
alkali in soil and the inefficient drainage system (Shapiro, 2001).  
        In sum, using institutional theory, this chapter explains institutional structures, 
especially economic and political centralization, which affected the making and 
implementation of development policies in pre-1979 China. These policies reduced 
Chinese economic inequality and helped the Inland and West construct a solid industrial 
and social basis for further development. These policies, however, also caused some 
problems, such as economic inefficiency and environmental degradation in the Inland and 
West, and partially motivated economic reform in 1979. Therefore, when the CCP 
initiated economic reform in 1979 to increase economic efficiency, the preferential 
policies for the Inland and West were to be abolished and the growth of the two areas 







Chapter Six   Political Restructuring and Changes in Chinese Regional Inequality during 
the Reform Period (1979-2005) 
 
        This chapter examines the way Chinese political institutions and institutional 
changes increased regional inequality in post-1979 China. The chapter first introduces 
vital changes in political institutions, including the shifts of dualism--power distribution 
between Chinese central and local governments, the altered policy-making process, and 
new policy-making agencies. The chapter then extends the study to the essential 
economic institutions that affected Chinese regional inequality. The chapter tries to show 
political institutional changes after 1979 engendered new economic institutions and 
policies, including decentralized decision-making system, marketization, specific taxation 
rules, targeted investment policy, and the two-track price system; these policies further 
impacted regional inequality in post-1979 China.   
        After 1979, the CCP claimed that “it is unrealistic to develop China’s three regions 
at the same speed” (Dong, 1999). The chapter hence studies specific strategies such as the 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) policy that were aimed to develop the Chinese economy 
but eventually enlarged Chinese regional inequality after 1979. All these institutional 
strategies altered policy-making and affected factor mobility across Chinese regions, 
which affected Chinese regional inequality. In addition, the chapter also studies the 
“Developing the West” policy that was initiated by the CCP in 1998 to reduce regional 





      Institutional Approach and the Changing Chinese Regional Inequality since 1979 
        As far as I have discussed about the change in Chinese regional inequality, 
Institutional Theory (IT) seems to be the most powerful approach to explaining the shift 
of regional inequality after 1979 as it focuses on institutional changes that fundamentally 
drive the change in regional inequality. The three alternative explanations--economic, 
cultural, and international relations theories--are insufficient to explain these changes, 
and Institutional Theory provides a powerful approach to solving this problem.  
        First, as I have mentioned in Chapter three, conventional economic theories argue 
that the difference of regional resource endowment is the main reason that generates 
regional inequality. But these theories cannot effectively explain the enlarging regional 
inequality in post-1979 China. That is, according to conventional economic models, if the 
difference in resources remains the same, regional economic inequality should not change 
a lot. But in the past several decades, Chinese regional inequality did change twice.  
        Second, the cultural model argues that the pro-business cultural values dominant 
among Coastal residents might have facilitated Coastal development, but it still cannot 
explain the way regional inequality increased after 1979 while cultural variables 
remained constant. 
        Finally, international relations theories explain that improved relations with other 
countries helped the Coastal area to develop, but they cannot explain well of the 
dynamics and deep structures that determined regional inequality in post-1979 China. 
The question is: China had greatly improved its relations with most foreign countries 
since 1971, but why did Chinese regional inequality only begin to change after 1979?   
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        In short, these three approaches neglect endogenous factors, such as specific policies 
and economic institutions, which drove and enlarged regional inequality. 
        As this chapter shows, IT effectively explains changes in Chinese regional 
inequality that other models cannot explain. IT explores changing institutions, such as the 
change in economic policy-making, the shift of power structure between the central and 
local government, and SEZs, etc., which increased Chinese regional inequality. By 
exploring these changing institutions, IT successfully traces correlations between Chinese 
institutions and the changing pattern of Chinese regional inequality.  
 
                                          Reforming Political Institutions after 1979  
        A series of fundamental changes in Chinese political institutions occurred after 1979 
that significantly affected Chinese political and economic development. Mao died in 
October 1976, and his death opened opportunity window for reformers in the party when 
many top political leaders tried to end the Cultural Revolution and alter old institutions 
that they claimed to have inhibited Chinese economic development..  
       The Cultural Revolution directly undermined the interests of party veterans, military 
leaders, and many influential Chinese when the CCP tried to realize the institutionalized 
goal of equity. Those victims strongly opposed the CCP’s equity goal and urged the party 
to design preferential policies for well-developed areas to develop faster and then develop 
the entire Chinese economy. Advocated by post-Mao leaders Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianyin, 
and Deng Xiaoping, who had strong desire to develop the Chinese economy to mobilize 
people’s support, the CCP successfully terminated the Cultural Revolution by arresting 
the “Gang of Four”, the loyal supporters to old institutions in the central government, in 
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October 1976 (Baum, 1994: 27-29).28
        The fundamental institutional change occurred in December 1979 when the CCP 
started to stage economic reform at the third plenum of the party’s eleventh committee. 
The CCP believed that the reform could enhance the party’s decreasing legitimacy caused 
by high-handed political control. The CCP first set some new governing rules such as 
decentralization and collective leadership in decision-making (Baum, 1994:14-18). After 
1979, the party allowed local regions to have more economic autonomy which changed 
the dualism of power balance between the central and local governments. The central 
government and the CCP also encouraged private investment, which was perceived an 
essential to develop China quickly (Pang, 1984). More important, the CCP and the central 
government perceived uneven development an effective way to develop the Chinese 
national economy, so by introducing the SEZs to develop the Coastal area the CCP and 
the Chinese central government began to gradually discard previous policies that aimed 
to reduce regional inequality (Gao, 2004).  
  However, because of institutional inertia, the CCP 
did not break with old institutions immediately. Indeed, the CCP and the government had 
to change the entrenched institutions gradually.  
        These institutional changes developed China but also reversed the trend of regional 
inequality after 1979. The following section discusses changes in political institutions, 
economic implications of changing institutional structures, and the shifting policy-
making processes after 1979.  
                                                 
28 This group included Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, the CCP’s vice Chairman Wang Hongwen, the vice 
premiere Zhang Chunqiao, and the leader of the state Propaganda Department Yao Wenyuan. The Gang of 
Four strongly advocated policies designed between 1949 and 1976.  The group won some support from the 
Inland and Western areas that benefited from these policies. 
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Partial Reform to Reestablish the CCP’s Legitimacy  
        The slow economic growth and social chaos during the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 
1976) undermined the legitimacy of the CCP. In the late 1970s, many Chinese, especially 
those Coastal residents, complained that the CCP did not increase people’s income as the 
party had promised. Millions of educated youths assigned to work in rural areas wanted 
to come back to their hometown cities. Workers in SOEs also wanted higher incomes. In 
addition, social discontents and pro-democracy movements, initiated by intellectuals in 
Beijing, pressured the CCP to reform. Professors and college students posted their 
political claims in parks near Beijing University to mobilize mass support and insisted the 
CCP modernize China via economic reform and democratization (Baum, 1994: 107-09).   
         All these problems undermined the Chinese belief that the socialist road was 
beneficial for China’s modernization. To restore its decreasing legitimacy, the CCP 
began to launch partial reform, which the CCP believed could avoid possible social and 
political risks (Wu, 2004; Yang, 2003). 
        The CCP did acknowledge that political reform was beneficial, but it had to be 
gradual and must be limited to an acceptable scope. According to the CCP, a full-scale 
political reform would undermine the political authority of the communist party.29
                                                 
29  The new CCP of course removed some political officials such as the Gang of Four and many local 
officials from the government in 1976. But strictly speaking, the change was not a reform because it was 
only a political struggle among leaders. Such struggles had occurred many times during Mao’s leadership.  
  Some 
administrative reforms would be allowed or even encouraged, but the CCP leadership 
must be retained. The CCP maintained that the introduction of Western liberal democracy 
to policy-making did not serve the Chinese interests because it would weaken central 
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authority in China. The party correlated the chaos during KMT’s governance (1912 to 
1949) with the weak central authority. The CCP thus posited that Western democracy 
would engender a weak central government in China because it distributed power across 
various political organizations.30 Because of such fear, although the CCP strongly 
advocated the “Four Modernizations” to develop China, only gradual political reform was 
suggested in post-1979 China.31
 
  As for economic reform, it posed little threat to the CCP 
but it could increase general prosperity, which would increase mass support for the party 
(Harding, 1987). Thus, the CCP avoided major political changes but supported economic 
reform by reducing the party’s intervention in economic affairs.  
Collective Leadership and the Power Balance among Top Leaders 
         Although the CCP opposed major political reforms after 1979, the new situation 
helped to change the CCP into a very difficult governing institution after 1979. Thomas 
Baylis argues that after the departure of charismatic leaders in communist countries, 
“political leadership appeared to become less personal and more institutionalized” 
(Baylis, 1989: 92-93).  This was the case in post-1979 China. Although Mao had already 
been constrained by Chinese institutions, Mao’s successive CCP leader Deng Xiaoping 
and his successors had to share more powers with other leaders, which Deng labeled as 
                                                 
30 This argument was untenable and elicited many criticisms from intellectuals, but since the CCP tightly 
controlled the media and educational system, the argument was soon accepted by the masses. 
31 The “Four Modernizations” referred to the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defense, and 
technology. The slogan was first proposed by the Premiere Zhou Enlai in 1973, but political struggles 
among top leaders between 1974 and 1979 obstructed the implementation of it.  
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the “Collective Leadership” (Deng, 1993). This new institutional arrangement further 
constrained senior leaders’ influences on Chinese political economy. 
        The coalition that governed post-1979 China included party reformers, opportunists, 
and party veterans with no definite political inclinations (Baum, 1994). All theses 
participants had top positions in the party and government. This generated the “rise of a 
set of relationships among leaders in the party that can be characterized as a balance of 
power” (Baylis, 1989; 117-118).  This situation meant that Deng, who was seventy four 
years old in 1979, had to share power with other veteran leaders in policy-making.  
        The reformed power structure after 1979 had several important characteristics. First, 
the collective leadership increased efficiency of decision-making. Due to the power 
balance among top leaders, different opinions had to be considered in decision-making, 
which expanded the range of policy options they considered. To avoid attacks from 
political rivals, the Chinese leaders also must be cautious in designing policies. Grand 
policy changes were thus replaced by incremental adjustments which entailed smaller 
risks and less uncertainty (Naughton, 2007:86-91).  In addition, when “greater expertise 
had been brought into the regime’s deliberations” to enhance the efficiency of policy-
making, the Chinese government began to adopt more suggestions from experts when 
making economic policies during the post-1979 era. In many SOEs (State Owned 
Enterprises), engineers and technicians also constituted the majority of the governing 
committee and determined SOEs’ operation (Baylis, 1989: 105-106). 
        Second, power struggles among top Chinese leaders or different factions sometimes 
obstructed the making or implementation of effective policies. The leaders came “to see 
their survival and their ability to dominate policy in their own field of specialization as 
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dependent upon their preventing any one of their number from being too powerful” 
(Baylis, 1989: 117-118). When there was a political stalemate among leaders with 
roughly equal power, it became difficult to pursue large changes in economic policies. 
Top leaders might ask or signal their provincial supporters to resist the policies designed 
by their rivals.  For example, the 1986 price reform advocated by CCP’s general secretary 
Zhao Zhiyang was aborted due to the strong opposition from Zhao’s rivals, including 
premiere Li Peng, and vice premiere Yao Yilin, the head of Chinese Planning Committee 
(Zhang, 2001). Between 1990 and 1991, economic adjustment initiated by party 
hardliners to halt corruption was also vetoed by moderate leaders who feared such 
adjustment was intended to stop China’s economic reform (Baum, 1994: 317-318).  
Third, with more local leaders being promoted to national policy-making positions after 
1979, regional development policies often reflected conflicts of regional interests in the 
central government. Leaders promoted from different regions fought for their own area’s 
preferential policies to cater to regional interests. After 1979, economic growth became a 
major criterion for evaluating and promoting local officials. Leaders from the Coastal 
area were more likely to be promoted to the central government, therefore, because the 
area experienced higher GDP growth rate than the other two regions. During Jiang 
Zemin’s leadership (1993 to 2002), of the seven top leaders in the Politburo, six came 
from or had long working experiences in the Coastal area. During Hu Jingtao’s 
governance (after 2002), all of the nine members in the Standing Committee of the 
Central Politburo (SCCP) came from the Coastal area.  
        Because Coastal leaders became the majority in the SCCP, they were more likely to 
make preferential policies for the Costal region. This is path dependent for strengthening 
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institutional advantages of the Coastal area. For example, in 1993 Jiang and other Coastal 
leaders in the SCCP issued policies to develop Pudong, a district in Shanghai that Jiang 
once governed. The central government not only allocated plentiful funds to Pudong, it 
also reduced investment taxes in Pudong. The policy helped Shanghai to become the 
leading growth area in China after 1995 (Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 211-13).   
         These new institutional arrangements weakened the central government’s ability to 
reduce regional inequality. Regional policies made after 1979 were mainly preferential to 
the Coastal area. Although the CCP had also to consider claims from the other two 
regions, the central government often found it difficult, due to the pursuit of local 
interests, to encourage the Coastal area to advocate policies preferential to the other two 
regions (Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 219-26; Wedeman, 2003: 247-52). 
        Thus, as Baylis argued that collective leadership may “correspondingly exert 
conservative effects on policy”, the new political institutions in post-1979 China are 
necessary for explaining why the Chinese central government could not effectively 
reduce regional inequality even if it had tried to (Baylis, 1989: 119).  
 
Decentralization: The Changing Process of Policy-making after 1979 
        Another important change in Chinese political institutions after 1979 was that 
dualism changed with policy-making increasingly decentralized; that was, more sub-
national actors began to directly or indirectly participate in the process of policy-making 
and local and provincial actors had more veto power (Baylis, 1989: 106; Baum, 1994). 
        There were several reasons for the CCP to introduce decentralization into the 
process of public policy-making. The first reason was because of the strong support from 
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Deng and some other top leaders who perceived the centralized planning system as too 
rigid to move China’s industrialization. These leaders thought it was more efficient for 
local agencies to design policies for their own areas because local officials obtained more 
accurate local information than the central agencies. Thus Deng and some other central 
leaders support the CCP decentralize key economic policy choices. The CCP and the 
central government also believed that the decentralization could develop local economy, 
arguing the more economic autonomy local governments enjoyed the more effectiveness 
for economic policy-making (Yang, 2001; Deng, 1993; Jiang, 1993).  
        Second, incremental reform in economy had a cumulative effect that pressured the 
central government to consider more of developed regions’ interests. After 1979, the 
central government became more dependent on revenues from developed areas, which in 
turn increased these areas’ power in shaping policy-making at the central level. 
Provincial leaders from the Coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, and 
Shandong, who produced higher revenues to the central government than other local 
leaders, had great power in affecting decision-making in the central Politburo as the 
central government had to win local areas’ financial support. In addition, the increasing 
power of private enterprises and the inefficiency of Chinese SOEs also limited the central 
government’s capacity to acquire sufficient economic resources to direct China’s 
development (Yang, 2001). 
        Third, the CCP began to admit that neither the communist party nor the central 
government were omnipotent in managing economic policy or reacting promptly to local 
market conditions. The CCP thought that each region should responsible for its own 
development, while the central government only acted as a coordinator to mitigate 
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regional conflicts. Thus, after 1979 although the CCP insisted that the Politburo still had 
the absolute authority in making major policies, the party allowed local party branches 
and governments to retain enough power to manage regional economic issues (Baum, 
1994; 11-12). 
         The decentralization of economic policy-making in post-1979 China reduced 
central government’s intention and ability to intervene in economic policy-making (Wu, 
2004). Decentralization gave local governments more power in levying taxes and 
managing local SOEs. Decentralization also overcame the insufficient information 
problem in managing local economy because local governments could get prompt and 
direct local information (Stiglitz, 1994). For example, with increasing economic 
autonomy after 1979, the Coastal area successfully developed the Town and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) (Wei, 2000; Yang, 2001; Zhao, 2006). The central government 
supported the developed of TVEs in the Coastal area for several reasons. First, foreign 
investors wanted to invest in Coastal TVEs because they believed such investment would 
bring high return. Moreover, the investment to TVEs did not require large amount of 
money, which attracted many small investors (Pang, 1984).  Second, TVEs hired many 
workers which enhanced the power of the “working class” (Gongren Jieji).  Third, TVEs 
added new revenues for the local and central government (Wei, 2000; Yang, 2001). Local 
governments in the Coastal area assured that TVEs would be treated as state-owned 
firms, which further alleviated some central government concerns (Yang, 2001).  
        Decentralization increased Chinese regional inequality after 1979. Although the 
central government also allowed the West and Inland to develop local TVEs, the support 
to them was trivial and the TVEs in the two areas were at a disadvantage in competing 
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with Coastal TVEs. The Coastal area had more educated and capable officials and was 
more flexible and efficient than the other two areas in designing and implementing 
regional development policies. Even if the West and Inland could design policies for 
regional development, some disadvantages still constrained the two areas’ economic 
development. For example, after the early 1990s, the West and Inland tried to use low tax 
incentives to attract potential investors. However, the two areas still could not effectively 
compete with the Coastal area in attracting investment, because potential investors 
preferred investment in more developed areas. As Table 6.1 shows, Costal TVEs 
contributed to most TVE exports between the 1980s and 1990s, partially contributing to 
the enlarging regional inequality after 1979.  
 
                  Table 6.1 Total Value of Exports by Chinese TVEs: 1985-1993 
                                           (Amount in billion Yuan; Shares in percentage) 
 
      Year   National Coastal Inland West Inland+West 
1985 Amount 3.90 3.23 0.57 0.10 0.67 Share 100.0 82.8 14.6 2.6 17.1 
1990 Amount 48.56 43.09 4.77 0.70 5.47 Share 100.0 88.7 9.8 1.5 11.3 
1991 Amount 66.99 59.78 6.26 0.96 7.22 Share 100.0 89.2 9.4 1.4 10.8 
1993 Amount 235.05 217.56 15.43 2.05 17.48 Share 100.0 92.6 6.5 0.9 7.4 
Source: Dali L. Yang and Houkai Wei (1995). 
 
 
                      Institutional Innovations to Adjust Economy in Post-1979 China 
         The changes in political institutions after 1979 helped the CCP and Chinese 
government to institutionalize several tools that strengthened markets. The partial reform, 
the collective leadership, and the decentralization made it viable for the CCP and Chinese 
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government to largely reduce direct intervention and allow more free economic 
transactions. These institutionalized tools included the deliberate expansion of the free 
market, the diversification of tax rates, and targeted investment policies. All of these tools 
enhanced local autonomy, and increased Chinese regional inequality after 1979 when the 
CCP and Chinese government increasingly believed that policies of reducing inequality 
were economically inefficient. 
 
The Gradual Marketization in Post-1979 China   
        The CCP after 1979 gradually came to believe that the market, instead of 
administrative orders, could be an effective tool to allocate resources. This new 
perception arose from the CCP’s increasing technocratic governance after the 1970s. The 
CCP began to listen to suggestions from domestic and foreign economic experts. The 
economic difference between China and developed countries also convinced the party 
that the market was an effective tool to help China develop quickly (Deng, 1993).   
        However, due to institutional constraints, the market system had to phase in 
gradually in the Post-Mao period (Zhao, 2006).  Some party veterans, for example, 
insisted that the market signaled the resumption of capitalism in China and only served 
the interests of very few social members, which undermined the basis of socialism. To 
appease such complaints, the CCP had to implement and designate economic reforms 
carefully.  In 1979, the Chinese market system was defined as “socialism market”. In 
1988, the name was changed to “the market under the guidance of socialism”. In 1992, 
the CCP renamed the market as “planned commercial economy”. In the late 1990s, the 
CCP termed the market as “market economy”.  The changing names on the one hand 
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showed the intensification of economic reform and the expansion of the market system in 
allocating resources in China; on the other hand it showed the importance of “problem 
definition” in making Chinese economic policies when ideological issues are still 
important factors to affect policy-making (Baum, 1994; Xiong, 2005: 52-58). 
        The expansion of the free market widened regional inequality in post-1979 China 
because economic deficiencies of enterprises in the West and Inland put them at a 
comparative disadvantage in competing with Coastal enterprises. As Chapter Five shows, 
many enterprises in the two underdeveloped areas were set in remote and distant areas to 
increase their survivability in possible wars. After 1979, the huge transportation costs for 
acquiring resources and selling manufactured goods substantially increased enterprise 
costs in the West and Inland. Indeed, many enterprises in the two areas were built to 
produce military products before the late 1970s. The highly specialized technology 
designed to produce military products also made it difficult for these enterprises to 
produce profitable goods (Zhu, 1999).  
         On the other hand, the marketization policy offered a good opportunity for Coastal 
enterprises to regain momentum to expand and develop their competitive advantages. In 
the late 1970s, China continuously introduced advanced technologies, mainly mechanical 
and chemical engineering skills, from Western countries, but most of them were 
transplanted to the Coastal area.32
                                                 
32 The importation of technologies from Western countries began in 1973 after China had reached a 
rapprochement with the US and other major Western countries. However, due to the constraint of the “self-
reliance” ideology, the scale of such technological importation was limited before 1979. 
  The Coastal area also benefited from international 
trade as it owned all major ports. Investment from foreign countries or overseas Chinese, 
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who expected a higher investment return in the Coastal area, provided sufficient capital 
for the area’s economic take-off when the open-door policy was implemented after 
1979.33
 
  The higher wage level in the Coastal area and the loosened restrictions on travel 
after 1979 also attracted well-educated workers from the Inland and West, which further 
increased the Costal area’s productivity (Iredale, 2000).  
Diversified Tax Rates across Regions    
        One important economic policy that affected Chinese regional inequality after 1979 
was the permission for tax rates to differ geographically. In 1979, the CCP stipulated that 
each provincial area should act as an independent economic unit. To encourage local 
governments to develop their local economy, the central government required each 
province submit a fixed proportion of tax to the central government and keep the rest of 
its income. This institution was called Baogan, which motivated local areas to develop 
economy as they could retain more for local use when aggregate local income 
increased.34
        The tax federalism was based on the assumption that it was inefficient for the central 
government to design a standard tax rate for provinces with different economic levels 
(Qian, 2003). The Chinese central government in the 1980s believed that standard tax 
discouraged regions to develop their economic potential. By using different tax rates and 
    
                                                 
33 The geographic proximity to international trade motivated many Coastal residents to migrate to other 
countries before 1949. When they got rich, they invested back home, partly for showing off but also for 
helping their hometowns.  After 1979, oversea Chinese became the main FDI provider to the Coastal area.  
34 This policy was first implemented in rural areas to encourage peasants to increase agricultural products in 
the late 1979. The success of this policy encouraged Chinese leaders to apply it to other areas.  
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allowing each province keep the local income after the tax, provinces were motivated to 
develop local economy (Chowdbury, et al, 2000). For example, Coastal enterprises 
enjoyed a fifteen percent tax rate on profits, but tax rate in the Inland and West was thirty 
five percent. Foreign Direct Investment Enterprises (FDIEs), most of which were set in 
the Coastal area, paid at an even lower rate than domestic enterprises. 
        Differentiating tax rate further unbalanced regional economies in China (Wedeman, 
2003: 27-57).  The policy put the Coastal area in advantaged status in competing with the 
other two regions for investment (Wedeman, 2003; Wong, 2003). In addition, since the 
absolute profits in the Coastal area were much higher than those the other two areas, 
Coastal authorities could garner more revenues than other areas (Tsai, 2004). This policy 
thus enabled the Costal government to improve local infrastructures to induce further 
investment. The Inland and Western areas were at a severe competitive disadvantage 
because they had to impose higher taxes than the Coast, provide fewer services, or a 
combination of the two. 
        The tax policy also reduced central government’s capacity to redistribute funds 
across regions to adjust regional inequality. In 1979, the central government was 
responsible for about forty six percent of local expenditures, but in 2001 that figure fell to 
only ten percent (Wong, 2003).  
 
Targeted Investment Policies after 1979 
         The targeted regional development policies gave the Coastal area great discretion in 
attracting investment or technologies. After 1979, public investment policy by the 
Chinese central government greatly favored the Coastal area. Between the 1980s and 
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1990s, about fifty four percent of all government investment went to the Coastal area, 
higher than that to the other two areas combined (Zeng, 1999: 397).   
 
Table 6.2   Regional Distribution of Investment in Capital Goods (billion yuan), 
1979-2005 
 









Share of fixed investment 





























Source: Wei, 2000. p89. Chinese Statistic Yearbooks. 
 
 Table 6.3   Cumulative Distribution of Direct Investment across Regions, 1979-2005 
Year 1979-2005 1979-2005 
 Per capita amount of cumulative direct 
investment in each region (yuan) 
Share of cumulative direct 
investment in each region (%) 
Total  100 
Coastal 1144 83.7 
Inland 189 11.4 
West 93 4.9 
    Source: Chinese Statistic Yearbooks. 
  
      Table 6.2 also shows that the major proportion of the investment in capital goods, 
such as machines, was allocated to the Coastal area, and table 6.3 shows per capita 
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cumulative direct investment and the share of cumulative direct investment in each region 
between 1979 and 2005.35
        The central government also designed preferential policies for the Coastal area to 
successfully attract foreign investment (See Table 6.4). Inspired by the rapid economic 
development of the Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea), the 
CCP argued in 1979 that foreign investment and foreign trade were indispensable factors 
to Chinese development (Dong, 1999). Hence, in 1979 the CCP opened some special 
Coastal zones for engaging foreign trade or attracting foreign investment. Local 
governments in the Coastal area had the authority to offer Foreign Direct Investment 
Enterprises (FDIEs) and foreign trade companies three years of free tax, free land use, 
and guaranteed assistance of infrastructure facilities. The other two areas, however, were 
not authorized to design similar policies to attract investment and technology.  
   
 
                    Table 6.4     Regional Distribution of FDI (%), 1983-2005 
Region 1983 1985 1988 1990 1993 1995 2000 2002 2005 
Coastal 92.9 
 
89.6 88.7 93.9 87.5 87.7 86.3 86.05 87.74 
Inland 1.1 5.2 5.7 8.8 8.8 9.2 7.64 8.86 7.51 
West 5.9 5.2 5.7 3.7 3.7 3.1 6.05 5.09 4.75 
       Source: Wei, 2000. p89. Chinese Statistic Yearbooks. 
  
     
                                                 
35 Direct investment means investment directly invested in building factories, infrastructures, or any 
projects that are intended to produce something. Direct investment can be classified as domestic direct 
investment (DDI) and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
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The “Two-Track Price” System 
         Although the market gradually became the main agency to decide prices in post-
1979 China, the Chinese government still controlled the pricing of some important goods. 
The CCP and the central government after 1979 implemented the “Two-Track Price” 
(TTP) policy to encourage the development of the Coastal area. The TTP set two prices 
for the same goods in different areas. The central government first ordered SOEs to 
provide a certain amount of important resources or goods, including coal and electrical 
power, to the central government with low fixed prices. The central government then 
reallocated these resources or goods to places where it perceived necessary. The SOEs 
were allowed to sell products or resources in the market only when they had fulfilled the 
product quota designed by the central government.  
        This policy benefited the Coastal area at the expense of the other two regions. All 
through the 1980s SOEs in the other two areas provided the Coastal area with coal, 
electric power, iron ore, agricultural products, and other resources at low prices. The 
regulated prices of these goods sometimes were only thirty percent of the market prices, 
although SOEs in the two regions received subsidies from the central government to 
cover some of the price discrepancy. Before 1979, however, most of these resources were 
sold to the Coastal area with much higher prices (Chen, et al. 1992; Wong, 2003).  
        This system guaranteed that the Coastal area could acquire resources with low price. 
Even after the mid-1990s, the Coastal area still acquired electric power, agricultural 
products, raw materials, and other important resources from the other two regions 
through the fixed price system. 
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                      The Two Grand Strategies and the Growing Regional Inequality  
        After 1979, the CCP believed that the suppression of the Coastal development to 
reduce regional inequality had inhibited China’s economic growth, and China should 
develop unevenly because of regional difference in productivity (Deng, 1993; Gao, 
2003). The CCP thus decided to modernize China by first liberating the productive 
potential of the Coastal area and then gradually developing the other two areas.  
        In 1979, the CCP implemented the Two Grand Strategies (TGS) for Chinese 
economic development.  According to this policy, China would use two methods to 
manage its economy. The first method was socialism, which China had already 
implemented. The second approach was modernism, which ventured to advanced skills or 
technologies that existed in developed countries (Gao, 2003). The CCP assured the public 
that this approach served capitalist interests, but it could also serve socialist interests 
because the approach itself was a value-free tool that the CCP could use (Deng, 1993).   
         The CCP began to implement the TGS in some Coastal cities in the early 1980s. If 
the policy worked, then the CCP would extend it to other areas. If it failed, then the CCP 
would try alternate policies for economic development (Gao, 2003). Thus the TGS also 
referred to the development of Chinese national economy with two steps. China should 
first encourage the Coastal development by implementing the SEZs policy with favorable 
tax, investment, and other preferential policies. After the Coastal area attained a certain 
economic growth, which the CCP did not define, the government would transfer its 
policy focus to the Inland and West by enlarging the SEZs (Chen, 1998).  
        The CCP implemented the Two Grand Strategies gradually (See Figure 6.1 and 
Table 6.5).  In 1979, the policy designated only four cities to enjoy the Special Economic 
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Zones (SEZs) strategy. The four cities, Shengzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen, thus 
became the “windows of reform” of China (Baum 1994: 67; Yang, 1997). In 1984, when 
the SEZs policy succeeded in the four cities, the CCP extended the SEZs to fourteen 
more cities in the Coastal area. With rapid economic growth of these cities, the Chinese 
government designated Hainan Island as SEZ province in 1988 (Baum 1994:227).  In 
1992, the CCP extended the SEZs to the entire Coastal area and a few well-developed 
cities in the Inland and West (Dennis, 1995; Yang, 1997).  
 
                        Table 6.5    The Expansion of Chinese SEZs since 1979 


















Hainan province The entire Coastal 
area and well-
developed cities in 
the West and Inland 
Sources: Chinese National Statistics Bureau (CNSB).  Various Years Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
        The CCP mentioned that the first step----to develop the Coastal area----would take 
about twenty years. During this period, local Coastal governments would be granted 
enough autonomy to develop local economy. After that, the developed Coastal area 
would assist the development of the other two areas; but the CCP never specified what it 








             Figure 6.1 The Special Economic Zones of The People’s Republic of China (1979 to 1999) 
 






    Outcome of the Changing Institutions: The Enlarging Regional Inequality after 1979     
        The changing institutions and policies affected Chinese economic inequality after 
1979. Though all Chinese regions developed, regional discrepancy also enlarged.  The 
economic reform and the “open door” policy benefited the West and Inland. The solid 
economic and technological basis laid by the Five Year Plans and the Third Front project 
during Mao’s leadership made it possible for the two areas to develop during the post-
1979 period when constraints were removed by the CCP and the central government. The 
two areas consolidated the industrialization with more efficient allocation of resources 
via the market system. For example, private enterprises and SOEs in the two areas had to 
improve their operation to compete with enterprises in other areas, which partly increased 
their efficiency with the help of newly introduced technology and managerial skills. The 
improved transportation also made it more convenient for the Inland and West to 
communicate with the Coastal area, which helped to integrate a national market. Interior 
residents who worked in the Coastal area also founded their hometowns by sending a 
large amount of their wages home. The Western province Gansu, for example, had about 
twenty percent of its GDP from such remittance (Wong, 2003).  
        All these factors greatly helped the Inland and West develop. Modern industries 
developed in large interior cities, such as Xian, Lanzhou, Luoyang, Chengdu, Wuhan, 
Zhengzhou, and Kunmin, and the service industry also grew in the two regions. Overall, 
the two areas achieved an average growth rate of about 8.7 percent between 1979 and 
2005 (CNSB: 1980 to 2006).  
        However, the Coastal area developed much faster than the other two areas. The 
average annual growth rate of GDP in the Coastal area between 1979 and 2005 was about 
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12.8 percent (CNSB: 1980 to 2006).  More important, with a much strengthened 
industrial and technological base, the Coastal area had established a solid infrastructure 
for sustainable growth. The Coastal area received the majority of FDI and imported 
technology as it had low tax rate and excellent infrastructural facilities.  With high wages, 
the Coastal area also attracted about sixty percent of China’s highly educated workers 
(Yang, 2006). 
 
  Table 6.6   Contribution to the Chinese National GDP of the Three Regions (%) 
Area 1952 1979 2005 
West  9 21.3 18.3 
Inland 21 18.7 17.9 
Coastal 70 60 63.8 
Sources: Wang, 2006; Xia, 2003 
 
        These advantages expanded the Coastal area’s capacity to develop when the Chinese 
central government reduced its direct management of the Chinese economy (See Table 
6.6). At the end of 2004, the GDP per capita in the West was only about forty one percent 
of that of the Coastal area; the figure in 1979 was about sixty percent (Chen, 2005; Lin, 
2004). In extreme cases, the average income per capita for some Western counties was 
only about sixteen percent of that for a Coastal county (Wen, 2004).   
        The increasing regional inequality was also shown by the changing economic status 
of each region. At the end of 2005, the West only contributed to about 18.3 percent of 
Chinese national GDP, while to the Coastal area the proportion was 63.8 percent (Xia, 
2006).  At the end of 1979, the West contributed to about 21.3 percent of national GDP, 
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and the Coastal area contributed about sixty percent. In 1952, the West contributed to 
only about nine percent national GDP, while the Coastal area contributed about seventy 
percent. The gap of industrial productivity between each region was also large at the end 
of 2005. The Chinese average industrial product value per square kilometer (IPVS) in 
2005 was 386,000 Chinese yuan. The IPVS value in the three regions showed a three-
ladder difference with the West had an IPVS value of 57,000 yuan, the Inland 530,000 
yuan, and the Coastal area 5,150,000 yuan (Chen, 2005; Wang, 2006).36
 
   
  Table 6.7   Average Annual Growth Rate of the Three Regions since 1979 (%)  
Area 1979-1990 1991-2000 2001-2006 
West  7.51 8.81 11.15 
Inland 7.16 9.23 11.90 
Coastal 8.35 12.32 11.92 
Data Source: Calculated from Fan and Sun. 2008 (As Guangxi is reclassified as a Western province).  
 
                                                 
36 The difference in industrial productivity per square kilometers between the West and Inland is still 
consistent with what I illustrate in Table 6.6. First, according to Chinese Land Department, the West 
contains about 73.5 % of Mainland China’s area, while the Coastal area occupies about 12.2% and the 
Inland Contains about 14.2% of China’s total land area. The West is as about five times as large as that of 
the Inland area, meaning the difference of total industrial product value between the West and Inland must 
be smaller. Second, the figure only measured the difference in heavy industry, and the combined income 
from agriculture, fishery, service, and other economic departments in the West can be larger than that of the 
Inland. Third, large remittance into the West also helps to explain the reason that total GDP of the West is 
slightly larger than that of the Inland. 
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        Table 6.7 shows the difference of growth rate, which indicates that Chinese regional 
inequality, is still increasing although some policies, such as the “Developing the West”, 
have been designed by the Chinese government to reduce such inequality. As Table 6.7 
shows, although the growth rate of the Coastal rate during 2001 to 2006 was only slightly 
higher than that of the other two regions, we still need to consider two facts.  First, since 
the absolute economic value in the Coastal area was much larger than that of the other 
two areas, the slight difference in economic growth still meant a large discrepancy in 
absolute value in economic growth. Second, the West and Inland economic growth 
included their migrated workers’ remittances from the Coastal area, so the economic 
growth rate reported by the two areas did not really reflect their economic development.. 
In other words, the economic structures in the West and Inland did not really get 
improved to reduce economic inequality after 1979. 
 
           Reducing Regional Inequality after 1998: “Developing the West” Strategy  
          The CCP and the Chinese government during Mao’s leadership designed policies 
to reduce regional inequality. Believing that government intervention would choke 
China’s growth and the market would automatically adjust the inequality, the Chinese 
government after 1979 reduced direct interference in reducing regional inequality. This 
new institutional arrangement changed dualism and accelerated China’s economic growth 
but it also enlarged Chinese regional inequality after 1979.  
        The widening regional inequality after the early 1990s troubled the central 
government and the CCP.  One problem was the unstoppable migration of peasants from 
the Inland and West to the Coastal cities to seek higher wages when travel restrictions 
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were loosened after 1979. The Coastal area had established strong Town and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) before the late 1970s when the Cultural Revolution reduced central 
control over local issues. The TVEs’ development in the Coastal area laid a solid basis 
for the area’s rapid growth after 1979. As to the other two areas, they depended their 
economies mainly on the large SOEs and local TVEs did not develop very much (Yang, 
2001; Harvie, 2000). After the early 1980s the higher wages in the Coastal area and the 
lessening control over the residential record system (Hukou) attracted skilled workers 
from other areas to the Coastal area.  Even workers without skills or education also 
swarmed into Coastal cities to look for higher paid manual jobs (Iredale, 2000).  
        After the mid-1990s, because of the slower expansion of Coastal enterprises, many 
new migrants from the West and Inland found it very difficult to get a job. Some of them 
committed crimes in Coastal cities. Those who found a job still faced other problems. For 
example, they had to work more than twelve hours a day and only earn about thirty 
dollars a month. Sometimes bosses who had good relations with local officials would 
refuse to pay workers wages to reduce business costs (He, 2005).37
                                                 
37 These bosses could declare a false bankruptcy to refuse the payment to workers; they could also hire 
gangsters to suppress workers. These bosses often had good relations with local leaders, which also helped 
them always win the wage dispute cases with workers. 
  The Chinese central 
government frequently urged local governments to solve disputes between workers and 
business owners but rarely succeeded as local officials had little motivation to implement 
labor laws. Due to the lack of effective personal evaluation systems, local public 
officials’ career path was often based on local GDP growth or their personal loyalty to 
senior patrons. Local officials thus would not offend businesses that could increase the 
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local GDP level. In addition, the extensive inflow of labor force to the Coastal area also 
exerted great pressure on the underdeveloped interregional transportation network in 
China, which inhibited the mobility of other needed resources across the three regions. 38
        Second, regional inequality had worsened ethnic relations in China that 
subsequently would hold back China’s national integration. Western provinces, 
especially Xinjiang and Xizhang (Tibet), were heavily populated by ethnic minorities. 
Local minorities complained that the Western backwardness was caused by the ethnic 
Han policy designs. In areas with poorly educated local residents and with strong 
attraction to radical ideologies, economic inequality encourages secessionist leaders, 
especially Islamic fundamentalists, to mobilize support against the Chinese central 
government. For example, radical Islamists in Xinjiang, the province with the largest 
ethnic minority in the West, had already instigated discontented residents to support the 
“East Turkistan” movement after the 1980s.
  
39
                                                 
38 The government claimed the extensive migration exerted great pressure on Chinese transportation 
system. The government had tried several means, including increasing transportation fares and building 
residential report system in host cities for newcomers, to control mobility of workers across regions, but 
with limited effect. In each Spring Festival, more than one hundred million workers migrate across the 
three regions.  
 Although the CCP had successfully 
suppressed all the riots, the party knew well that regional inequality was an important 
reason that caused discontents and riots (Chen, 2007).  
39 The “East Turkistan” movement was initiated in the 1930s by the ethnic minority Ur and was supported 
by the Soviet Union. After 1949, the movement was suppressed by the CCP, and some of its survived 
members fled to Turkey. The Leaders of this movement claimed they were decedents of ancient Turkey and 
Xinjiang was their motherland but was occupied by the Han majority. After 1979, because of the relative 
backwardness or the feeling of “relative deprivation” among the Urs, the movement revived (Chen, 2007). 
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        The final problem is the increasing economic conflicts across the three Chinese 
regions (Wedeman, 2003). After 1979, each region had greater autonomy in managing 
local economic affairs. To protect or develop regional interests, each region often 
implemented policies that conflicted with those made by other regions. For example, the 
West and Inland also competed with the Coastal area for purchasing cotton in the 1990s. 
The two regions believed cotton exportation to the Coastal area had obstructed the 
development of their own textile industries, so they prohibited the flowing of cotton to 
the Coastal area. In 1998, the Inland province Hubei prohibited the selling of Shanghai-
produced automobiles in its market in response to Shanghai’s exclusion of selling Hubei-
produced taxi-cabs in Shanghai market (Wedeman, 2003: 231-232).  The commercial 
conflict across Chinese regions also spread into other businesses such as DVD, iron, 
cotton, tobacco, and chemical products, which severely constrained efficient allocation of 
resources and hindered the formation of a national market in China.  
         The Chinese government after the mid-1990s pursued several approaches to 
addressing these problems. One was to urge local governments in the Inland and West to 
control their residents, and prevent so many migrating to the Coastal area. The two areas, 
however, resisted this pressure because migrant workers to the Coastal area would send 
back home a large proportion of earned wages, which facilitated the two regions’ 
economic development. The central government also asked Coastal cities to donate 
money or relocate some skilled workers to work in the other two areas. The Coastal area 
did transfer some money to the West and Inland, but the money was often used to 
subsidize to the poor people’s living expenses rather than invest in productivity growth. 
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In addition, due to the relatively lower wages in the other two areas, Coastal skilled 
workers would not move to the West and Inland.  
          To reduce regional inequality, the central government tried to mount a more 
comprehensive strategy. In 1998, the central government proposed the “Developing the 
West” policy to facilitate Western growth by calling for domestic and international 
investment and technologies (Jiang, 2006). The policy also applied to the Inland area. 
The central government gave local leaders more discretionary power than before to 
attract investment to the West or the Inland. Before 1998, any investment larger than 
thirty million dollars had to be approved by the central government, the approval process 
of could be as long as two years (Gao, 2004).  The new policy terminated this limit and 
encouraged private investors to invest in the West and Inland by offering them low 
interest rate loans from the central bank.  
        The new policy also aimed to improve the transportation system in the West and 
Inland. The CCP believed the poor transportation stalled the two regions’ further 
development. With improved and adequate transportation, it was believed, the two areas 
could more easily import needed technologies or products from other areas, and deliver 
their products or resources to the Coastal or international market. Thus after 1998, the 
Chinese central government invested billions of yuan annually to the two areas to 
improve local transportation, which reduced interregional transportation cost (Xia, 2008). 
        In response to the grand strategy, regional governments in the West and Inland also 
designed policies to attract investment and advanced technologies. Low taxes and low 
land prices, for example, were set for potential investors. The two areas also tried to call 
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for well-trained or highly educated workers by offering them higher wages or providing 
good jobs for their family members (Fan, 2003; Gao 2003, 2004).  
        Despite these policies, the resources input into the two regions after 1998 was still 
small compared to input into the Coastal area. More than half of new investment flowed 
into the Coastal area. Regional inequality still increased although a few scholars argued 
that the increasing rate began to slow down after 2002 (Gao, 2003, 2004; He, 2005). The 
main reason was because investors had already established profitable enterprises in the 
Coastal area. The expected lower returns or uncertainties of policy changes in the two 
regions discouraged real investment.  
        This case supports the argument that strong central intervention is necessary for the 
reduction of Chinese regional inequality. It also indicates that economic, cultural, and 
international relations theories, which usually neglect the role played by institutions, 
cannot effectively explain the frequent changes in Chinese regional inequality in the past 
decades. Only institutional theory, which studies changes in Chinese political institutions 
and hence governmental intervention, necessarily and sufficiently explain the real causes 
of, and solutions for, Chinese regional inequality. 
 
                                                              Conclusion 
        Institutional changes in post-1979 China vitally affected the making of related 
policies to change Chinese regional inequality. The end of radicalism and severe 
economic problems triggered China’s economic reform in 1979. These effects to save the 
flagging legitimacy of the CCP also fostered political pragmatism after 1979. The CCP 
became more concerned with the practical management than ideological purity. 
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Economic policies were designed to develop the Coastal area that was perceived by the 
party as the best prepared to develop quickly. The collective leadership made it less likely 
for individual leaders to control the making of economic policies at national level (Baum, 
1994; 9-10, 20-22). The decentralization of policy-making after 1979 tilted the power 
distribution from the Central to local governments, and enabled local governments to 
design policies based on local interests, which often lead to increasing economic conflicts 
among competing regions.  
         After 1979, the CCP undertook various institutional strategies to develop China, but 
with the main intention to develop the Coastal area. The Chinese central government 
implemented the free market, the two-track price system, and tilted investment and tax 
policies to develop or adjust China’s regional economy. But the dominance of Coastal 
leaders in the central Politburo encouraged the making of policies that were mainly 
preferential to the Coastal area. Even the “Developing the West” policy was 
implemented, the weak central intervention constrained its real effectiveness.  
         In sum, these institutions changes helped China achieve great economic growth but 
Chinese regional inequality also increased after 1979, causing severe problems that the 








            Chapter Seven   Conclusions: Institutional Constraints and the Two Shifts 
of Modern Chinese Regional Inequality (1949-2005) 
 
        This chapter summarizes main findings of this dissertation, maintaining that changes 
in Chinese political institutions vitally affected regional inequality in post-1949 China. 
The chapter also discusses policy and research implications of this dissertation, showing 
that IT (Institutional Theory) may also help us understand the way institutional changes 
impact the pattern of regional inequality in other economies.  
 
            Institutional Changes and the Shifts of Regional Inequality in Post-1949 China    
        This dissertation shows that institutions, including political parities, institutionalized 
norms, marketization, and dualism, significantly affected the shifts of Chinese regional 
inequality between 1949 and 2005. Durable changes in these institutions, especially 
political party and the power balance between the central and local governments, altered 
the policy-making process and policy outcomes.  
        Political organizations, especially the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were 
significant in shaping the pattern of Chinese regional development because they drove 
changes in economic institutions and thus indirectly affected the implementation of 
economic policies. For example, the Chinese National Planning Committee (NPC) was 
the direct design by the CCP and it effectively constrained Mao’s influences on economic 
policy-making. The operation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was also under the 
guidance of the CCP. In addition, economic policies such as the Five Year Plans, the 
Third Front Project, and the Two-Track price system were also generated by the shift of 
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the Chinese political institutions. As I have shown in these chapters, these economic 
institutions subsequently affected Chinese regional inequality.  
        As a dominant actor in Chinese political economy, the CCP directly impacted 
Chinese regional inequality. The party’s goals determined the policy repertoire that 
Chinese government could rely on between 1949 and 2005. Before 1979, the CCP 
highlighted the value of social equity and war preparation and fostered the making of 
policies that reduced regional inequality. After staging economic reform in 1979, the 
CCP was more concerned with economic efficiency, and designed preferential policies 
for the Costal area that was perceived to have better prepared for modernization. In 
addition, because of the CCP’s strict control, the market had limited effect on regional 
development before 1979. After the CCP starting economic reform in 1979, the control 
was loosened and potential investors’ pursuit of higher return helped the Coastal area 
attract the majority of foreign and domestic investment.  
         Dualism, or power structures between the Chinese central and local governments, 
which were important institutional elements in modern Chinese political economy, also 
impacted Chinese regional inequality. The CCP’s centralization policy and its tight 
control over the market constituted the essence of economic policy-making in pre-1979 
China. These institutional arrangements enabled the state or the CCP to be the sole actor 
in shaping the path of Chinese development. The CCP thus had the capacity to directly 
impact Chinese regional inequality. For example, the Five Year Plans (FYPs) and the 
Third Front Project drove the development of the Inland and Western areas before 1979.  
In contrast, the CCP’s political support to economic reform starting at 1979, though 
gradually, reduced direct governmental intervention and motivated marketization. The 
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post-1979 CCP encouraged private property rights to develop, which essentially changed 
the pattern of Chinese economic development. This policy enabled the market to 
increasingly become the main venue to allocate resources across Chinese regions and 
fostered the better-prepared Coastal area to develop faster than other areas.  Hence when 
the central government loosed economic control, it became difficult for the government 
to correct regional inequality. This has been exemplified by the Chinese government’s 
inability to reduce regional inequality by implementing the “Developing the West” 
strategy in 1998. Moreover, with increasing autonomy of local governments, the Coastal 
area was free to consolidate its advantageous status in regional competition for capital, 
technology, market, and skilled workers, which in turn reinforced economic inequality 
across the three regions. 
 
           Looking Back and Ahead: Policy and Research Implications of This Study 
        Chinese regional inequality has caused some severe problems in China. First, 
regional inequality strengthened regional identification and intensified regional conflicts, 
which in turn obstructed the formation of an integrated national market. The “automobile 
war” between Shanghai and Hubei province as I have mentioned supported this argument 
(Wedeman, 2003). Second, the intention to develop the local economy motivated the 
West and Inland to build industries that had already been established in the Coastal area, 
a development that caused redundancy in the Chinese economy (Yang, 2006). Third, the 
striving for the given amount of FDI triggered the “race to the bottom” process among 
the three regions, meaning local governments would sacrifice the long-run Chinese 
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interests to attract investment. Finally, as I have mentioned, regional inequality 
intensified ethnic conflicts in the West, which engendered political instability in China. 
        For these reasons, the Chinese government has to be more attentive to managing 
regional inequality because it affects Chinese economic development and political 
stability. The Chinese government on the one hand has to cultivate comparative 
advantages of each region, but on the other hand has to limit the growth of regional 
inequality as it is a threat to political stability. Designing effective institutions may be a 
powerful way to help the Chinese government balance development and regional 
inequality in the future, because institutions matter greatly in affecting Chinese regional 
inequality as this dissertation has shown. These institutions drive development with the 
help of the market, and they also provide assistance to the less developed region when 
market itself cannot redress the problem of regional inequality. 
        This dissertation uses the comprehensive framework---- IT---- to analyze the reasons 
and process of the changing Chinese regional inequality.  Although previous studies can 
explain some initial conditions that affected Chinese regional inequality, they offer only 
incomplete explanations for the changing inequality across the three Chinese regions 
after 1949. That is, they cannot successfully explain the two changes in Chinese regional 
inequality between 1949 and 2005.          
        IT is powerful for analyzing the shift of Chinese regional inequality because it 
explores specific reasons and mechanism that drove regional inequality shifts. For 
example, the theory successfully explains the way the shifts of Chinese political 
institutions vitally led to the change in Chinese economic institutions, which 
subsequently affected Chinese regional inequality after 1949. The main findings in this 
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dissertation hence show that IT is useful theoretical framework for analyzing the shifts of 
Chinese regional inequality. 
        Another major implication of this study is that IT theory may be applied to the study 
of regional inequality in other countries. My study shows that changes in political and 
economic institutions are more important than other factors in explaining uneven 
development in China.  
        Therefore, IT may also be expanded to study regional inequalities in three types of 
economies that have some similar characteristics as those in China. First, IT can be an 
effective approach to understanding regional inequality in communist or socialist 
countries that have similar political institutions as those in China. Indeed, the equalization 
of regional economy was often seen as an important feature of socialism (Wei, 2000:8-9). 
Socialist countries often institutionalized the ideology of egalitarianism to achieve the 
goal of poverty relief and equal distribution of wealth among social members (Murphey, 
1976; Simmons, 1979; Szelenyi, 1981; 12). These countries also built centralized fiscal 
and investment institutions to regulate economic development (Kornai, 1980, 1992; 
Wong 1991; Naughton 1995). Although empirical findings of the real effectiveness of 
policies to reduce regional inequality differed in former socialist countries, including the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, related studies all agree that institutions 
were important, if not the sole, factors to affect regional inequality in socialist countries 
(Clark, 1983; Liebowitz, 1987; Turnock, 1984; Ozornoy, 1991; Petrakos, 2001; Dienes, 
2002). Moreover, IT may also be an important tool for analyzing the dynamic relations 
between regional inequality and secessionist movement in China or formal socialist 
countries such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Plestina, 1992).  
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        Second, IT may be also useful to examine regional inequality in large developed 
countries such as the US, Australia, and Germany. Those countries have large areas and 
have regional inequality for historical, ethnic, political, and economic reasons. Thomas 
Courchene finds that the highly effective budget transfer system in Australia helped the 
country to reduce regional inequality, while Allan Morris finds that a specific relationship 
between Australian federal government and state government enabled the federal 
government to successfully transfer money to poor states such as Western Australia and 
Tasmania (Courchene, 2004: 24-25; Morris, 2004:127-147).  Richard Bensel also shows 
that specific institutions, including the Republican Party and specific developmental 
policies such as gold standard, the protective tariff, and the national market affected the 
trend of regional inequality in the US (Bensel, 2000). Finally, Paul Bernd Spahn studies 
regional inequality between Eastern and Western Germany and finds that besides 
historical reasons, the differentiation of power between German federal, state, and local 
governments significantly impacted regional development and the real effectiveness of 
policies designed to reduce regional inequality (Spahn, 2004: 166-176). 
        Third, IT may be used to examine regional inequality in developing and transitional 
economies. Brazil and India, for example, are transitional economies and also facing 
problems resulted from the widening regional inequality. The policies designed by these 
countries to reduce regional inequality may provide each other useful experience. Thrift 
and Forbes, for example, also reveal the institutional arrangement for welfare and 
national defense largely impacted spatial development policy and hence regional 
inequality in Vietnam (Thrift and Forbes, 1986).   
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        In sum, this dissertation first expands the theoretical application of IT by powerfully 
explaining a development puzzle in China, a large but transitional economy. The study 
finds that two fundamental changes in Chinese political institutions were the main factor 
that greatly impacted Chinese regional inequality after 1949. Other factors such as 
regional difference in natural resources, changes in international relations, or regional 
culture are insufficient to explain the shifts of Chinese regional inequality after 1949. 
Second, this dissertation also entails policy implications, arguing that instead of leaders’ 
personal preferences, regional cultures, or regional resource differences, it is institutional 
constraints that decision makers should pay more attention to in the future effort to 
change Chinese regional inequality. In addition, this study also indicates that IT may be 
useful in explaining regional inequality in countries that have some similar political and 
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